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The Experience of State Fair Employment
Commissions: A Comparative Study
Arnold H. Sutin*
In this article, Dr. Sutin discusses the work of state agencies charged
with enforcing fair employment laws. He surveys the substantive prin-
ciples which have been developed by these agencies in enforcing these
statutes, discusses the techniques and procedures of the commissions,
and examines their shortcomings. He concludes by suggesting ways in
which these agencies may be given a fuller opportunity to achieve
their purposes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Passage of the new federal civil rights law in 1964 might have
been expected to decrease the importance of the state fair employment
practices (FEP) laws. Congress, however, chose not merely to permit
these laws to continue in force to deal with purely local problems,
but went further to entrust the primary administration of title VII, the
federal fair employment statute, to state agencies where they exist.
Thus the experience of these state agencies is of even greater impor-
tance now than formerly, for they will perform the day to day work
of carrying out our nation's policy to prohibit discrimination in the
labor market.
Are the state commissions ready and able to take on this responsi-
bility? Have they demonstrated the imaginative determination that
is going to be required? Are they equipped with adequate powers to
achieve meaningful results? Or are these commissions too encumbered
by inadequate statutory authorization, inertia, political debts, and
timidity to be effective? These questions suggest the importance of
examining the experience of the state commissions since they first
began to appear at the end of World War II.
. All twenty-two state fair employment practice acts operating
through the vehicle of administrative commissions are designed to
encompass both public and private spheres of employment.1 Excep-
* Member of the Faculty, East Carolina College, School of Business.
1. Alaska, AmAssA STAT. § 23.25.040 (1962); California, CAL. LABOR CODE §§
1410-32; Colorado, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-19-1 (1953); Connecticut, CONN.
G~r. STAT. ANN. § 31-122 (1961); Delaware, 1 CCH LAB. L. REP. If 47,400 (1960)
(Delaware's rudimentary structure is not included in our study); HAwAn REv. LAws §
90A-1(c) (Supp. 1963); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 851 (Smith-Hurd 1961);
IND. ANx. STAT. § 40-2308 (Supp. 1964); Kansas, KAx. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1001
(Supp. 1961); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151(B), §§ 1-6 (1957); Michigan,
MIcE. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(1) (1955); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 363.01 (1957);
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tions from the jurisdiction of these acts are present in certain em-
ployer and employee categories and in their minimum employee
requirements. These areas have been notable in giving rise to com-
mission executive decisions and court litigations. Further, these acts,
while concerned with discrimination on the grounds of race, creed,
color or national origin, are, by reason of redundancy and variations
in terminology, susceptible of some confusion in interpretation. In
addition, decisions in the area of age discrimination, prohibited in a
minority of fair employment practice laws, have further contributed
to this large body of administrative law. However, it is in the adminis-
trative rulings evolving from the application of these laws to the
varied facets of unlawful employment practices that the entire legal
philosophy of fair employment practices commissions is best revealed.
A sufficient body of commission decisions and rulings have arisen
since the first commission was established in New York2 to permit a
systematic exposition, which I shall attempt to provide by employing
a comparative approach.
II. TBE LEGISLATIVE BASIS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF
STATE FuR EMPLOYMENT PRAcrIcEs COMMISSIONS
A. New York: Representative of Traditional
State Statutory Legislation
The passage of the Ives-Quinn Bill3 by the New York legislature
marked the establishment of the first Commission Against Discrimina-
Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 296.010(3) (Supp. 1964); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:25-12 (1963); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-4-1 (1953); New York, N.Y.
EXECUTIVE LAw §§ 290-301; Ohio, Oirto REV. CODE § 4112 (1959); Oregon, OnE.
REV. STAT. § 659.019 (1957); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 951 (1964);
Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-5-1 (1957); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 49.50.010 (1962); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32 (1958).
2. See, e.g., N.Y. EXECUTrE LAW §§ 290-301.
3. Name changed to "State Commission on Human Rights" on February 12, 1962,
effective Fall, 1962, N.Y. Hum. Rts. Comm'n, Newsletter vol. 3, no. 2. Governor
Rockefeller, commenting on the change, said: "It is far more than a mere change in
name. It reflects a conceptual evaluation to the point of view that a citizen of the
state does not merely have a right to ask state assistance because he has been dis-
criminated against, but rather that he is endowed with affirmative rights inherent to
all Americans. (The meaning of the phrase "endowed with affirmative rights" is
apparently political in nature, not legal). The affirmative connotation in the name
'Commission on Human Rights' more accurately represents the conscientious acceptance
by the people of this state of the fundamental precept in our Declaration of Inde-
pendence ...... Ibid.
We may note that other commissions have changed their names to convey more
accurately their increase in jurisdiction. Thus, Rhode Island amended its Fair Em-
ployment Practices Act, changing the name of this agency to "Commission Against
Discrimination" and empowered the commission to eliminate racial, religious and an-
cestral discrimination in the field of public accommodations including public housing
projects. R.I. STATE COMIsSSxON AGAINST DiscnRnNATioN, 1952 ANN. REP. 4
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tion (SCAD ).4 While New York was not the first state to prohibit
employment discrimination, it exceeded all other jurisdictions in com-
prehensiveness of legislative coverage in six major employment areas:
civil service, defense and war contracts, labor unions, public em-
ployees, public works and public school teaching.5
Three characteristics of these early statutes are particularly note-
worthy: their restricted application to specific fields of employment;
their narrow interpretation of "discrimination"; and their reliance for
enforcement on local criminal or civil proceedings. However, there are
two related major developments in anti-discrimination legislation
among the states since New York established the first commission.
The first is a significant increase in the number and diversity of similar
statutes, which subsequently have been strengthened, thereby per-
mitting findings of unlawful discrimination to be based on incidents
involving not only race, but religion, color, ancestry and national
origin.6 The second is a shift from relying on traditional means of
enforcement to the use of specific administrative agencies authorized
to enforce their determinations by court order, and charged to combat
discrimination in employment practices in broad areas of both the
private and public sectors of the economy.
7
It would be instructive to examine these traditional statutes in
order to understand the inherent weaknesses which necessitated this
second development. This may best be accomplished by considering
the statutory scheme of one jurisdiction, New York, which may be
considered as a representative model of states having traditional
statutes prior to the enactment of the first commission in 1945.
8
["State Commission Against Discrimination" is hereinafter referred to as SCAD.]
4. N.Y. ExEcutIVE LAw §§ 290-301.
5. N.Y. FEPC, 1944 ANN. REP. APP. J., at 148-50. A more comprehensive source
is: DuFFY, STATE ORGANIZATION FOR FAir EMPLOYMENT, Bureau of Public Administra-
tion, University of California (1944). Illinois, however, was reported to have had the
largest number of fair employment statutes-twenty-according to a federal study.
GnAvEs, LEGISLATI REFERENcE 19 (Library of Congress, Bulletin 93, April, 1951).
The discrepancy between the Duffy and federal reports would appear to be partly
attributable to the elusiveness and inaccessibility of many statutes.
6. Compare DUFFY, op. cit. suvra note 5, wilh GRAVES, op. cit. supra note 5, at
19-22 (the marked growth of such statutes among the states was reported four years
later in this federal study).
7. In New York, we may observe that there was never a particular statute on dis-
crimination in pre-employment generally, apart from discrimination in labor unions,
in any field of employment prior to the enactment of the Law Against Discrimination
N.Y. Crv. RiGirrs LAW § 43. While an amendment to the constitution, N.Y. CONST.
art. 1, § 11, and N.Y. PEN. LAw § 700, forbade discrimination of any person "in his
civil rights," the phrase "in his civil rights" actually was added by limitation to
confine the applicability to rights found in the then existent civil rights laws, Constitu-
tion and statutes. See 4 RLmED RECORD OF CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION, NEw YORK
2626 (1938).
8. Enactments prior to § 11 of the New York Constitution were as follows: N.Y.
Crv. PaG-rs LAw § 40(a) (originally enacted in 1932); N.Y. Crv. cHTs LANw §
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The earliest statute prohibiting discrimination in employment in
New York was enacted in 1918 and was incorporated into section
514 of the Penal Law. The statute makes it a misdemeanor to deny,
or to aid or incite another to deny to any citizen public employment
because of race, creed, color or national origin. Section 514 con-
tained a prior existing provision forbidding discrimination in public
accommodations.
The New York State Temporary Commission on the Condition of
the Urban Colored Population found, in analyzing Section 514
two decades later, that it was originally conceived as a traditional
civil rights measure prior to the 1918 incorporation, and thus failed
to reflect the distinctions between public employment and "public
accommodations... furnished by innkeepers or common carriers ...
or theatres or other places of amusements. .. ." As a remedy for
employment discrimination, therefore, it was inherently inadequate.
In explanation, the Commission pointed out that a refusal of public
accommodations, something which may be claimed as of right, does
not raise questions concerning the relative fitness of those discrimi-
nated against. This very difficult issue, however, lies at the heart
of fair employment litigation. Indeed, it is often the main obstacle
when one seeks to prove that refusal or denial of employment was
based on racial or religious considerations. The Commission observed
that the statute was designed as a punitive measure to expose, rather
than correct, discrimination in promotion, salary increase and dis-
missals.9
Apart from these shortcomings, the weaknesses in the use of
penal sanctions as the sole deterrent to wrongs committed in the
socio-economic sphere were coming to be recognized. Trial was by
a jury usually prejudiced in favor of the defendant, proof had to be
beyond a reasonable doubt, and local prosecutors or grand juries
were not easily persuaded to institute criminal proceedings at a time
when they were preoccupied with more traditional crimes. These
all militated against effective use of these sanctions. The Commission
42 (originally enacted in 1933); N.Y. LAB. LAw § 220(e) (originally enacted in 1935).
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 11 provides as follows: "[No person shall, because of race,
color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any
firm, corporation or institution, or by the State or any agency or subdivision of the
State." Apart from N.Y. PEN. LAW § 700-01 (originally enacted in 1941), additional
statutory implementations were as follows: N.Y. Crv. SEav. LAw § 14(b) (originally
enacted in 1939); N.Y. Civ. IGHTs LAw § 43 (originally enacted in 1940); N.Y.
PEN. LAW § 772(a) (originally enacted in 1940); N.Y. Civ. RIorrs LAw § 44
(originally enacted in 1941); N.Y. PEN. LAws § 514 (originally enacted in 1941);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 42-44 (originally enacted in 1942).
9. 1938 NEw Yonn STATE TEmpoRAlly CONUnMSSION AGAINST DIscm NATioN, RE-
PORT ON THE CONDITON OF THE URBAN COLORED PoPUrLArbON 38 [hereinafter cited
as N.Y. TEm. SCAD].
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was undoubtedly aware of two other limiting factors which are
inherent in penal statutes: (1) the lack of comprehensive coverage
resulting from the requirement that such statutes be specific enough
to meet constitutional challenge, and (2) the requirement that such
statutes be subject to strict judicial interpretation in accordance with
accepted canons of construction.
That these weaknesses were significant is indicated by the fact that
during the two decades following the passage of the 1918 New York
law not a single criminal conviction was obtained though there was
ample evidence of widespread discrimination in the state Civil
Service."0
The Commission therefore recommended remedial action which
included administrative enforcement by the Civil Service Commission.
This action ultimately resulted in the enactment of section 14b, of
the Civil Service Law. It also recommended that this new section
prohibit the denial of selection, appointment, promotion, increase of
salaries, or dismissal or suspension of any employee in the Civil
Service of the state, or its political subdivisions solely on account
of race, creed or color." This was one of the broadest exercises of
jurisdiction then prevailing in the administrative setup of any of
the existing state civil service commissions. 2
Other statutes imposing penal and civil penalties were also in
force in New York prior to the Ives-Quinn Bill. Section 40a of the
Civil Rights Law prohibited any person or agency employed or main-
tained to aid in obtaining positions in the public schools, any school
official, teacher, or employee of a board of education from asking,
indicating or transmitting, directly or indirectly, the religious affiliation
of any applicant for such employment.
Shortcomings were evident. Even though in civil suits for damages,
the burden of proof required was only a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the attendant difficulties characteristic of jury trials were at
once apparent. By the very nature of the offense involved, discrimina-
tion, the complainant was likely to be a member of one of the lower
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. It is interesting to note that, while New York was acknowledged as holding a
position of leadership in liberal civil service legislation, such states as California,
CAL. GCr. LAws Axw. § 201.5 (Deering 1941), and Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 741-502 (1942) had provided broader protection than New York N.Y. Civ.
SEnv. LAw § 14(b). These statutes, unlike the New York provision, had prohibited
any question or notations regarding race or religion, in addition to actual discrimination.
This had not been prohibited in New York until the passage of the Law Against Dis-
crimination. N.Y. Civ. PaGTS LAw § 43. This provision, which established a
remedy by way of petition to the Civil Service Commission by aggrieved employees or
prospective employees of the classified service of the state or any of its civil divisions
or cities, was repealed in 1958. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LA Ws § 790 (McKinney 1958).
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socio-economic groups of the community against whom public preju-
dices are strong. When an employer or agency was charged with
violation of the statute, juries were reluctant to find in favor of the
complainant in the absence of documentary evidence clearly estab-
lishing guilt. In addition, the expense of engaging counsel whose fee
was likely to be paid from the amount of damages awarded would be
a deterrent, since such damages would often be only nominal.
The restrictive grounds of the statutes providing for penal or civil
relief constituted glaring weaknesses. This is characteristic of other
jurisdictions with similar statutes. Thus, although section 514 of the
Penal Law prohibited discrimination in public employment on account
of race, creed, color or national origin as a basis for a misdemeanor
conviction, this section was atypical with respect to the grounds
provided generally in other New York non-discriminatory statutes,
as well as in the statutes of other major states such as New Jersey and
Ohio. These New Jersey and Ohio statutes referred only to political
or religious opinion or affiliation.
13
The New York Temporary Commission Against Discrimination,
recognizing the lack of comprehensiveness and conformity of coverage
within the statutory scheme, sought a bill to amend the anti-discrimi-
nation statutes in order to have them refer uniformly to "race, creed,
color or national origin," a jurisdictional phrase which is found in the
New York Law Against Discrimination and generally is included in
fair employment practice acts.14
Section 44 of the Civil Rights Law reveals another characteristic
weakness of traditional statutes, textual ambiguity. Section 44 makes
it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation engaged in the produc-
tion, manufacture or distribution of munitions or war material, equip-
ment or supplies, to deny employment to any person on account of
his race, creed, color or national origin. The penalty for such dis-
crimination is provided by sub-clause 1 of section 514 of the Penal
Law. At one time this sub-clause declared such discrimination against
a citizen a misdemeanor, while another sub-clause prohibited dis-
crimination in public employment and public accommodations, but
substituted the term "any other person" in lieu of "citizen." Because
of this ambiguity the contention could be advanced that sub-clause
1 sought to protect citizens only.15 This ambiguity, however, was
13. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11:17-1, 22-11 (1963); Omo REv. CODE §§ 486.11,
.17, .28 (1959).
14. N.Y. TEmP. SCAD, 1945 ANx. REP. 39.
15. This inconsistency may be partially explained by the fact that the provisions with
differing wording were added by amendment, the first in 1941 and th6 latter In
1942, and by the fact that the insertions were in a penal section which was primarily
intended to protect civil rights in public accommodations. The statute was later
amended to resolve the ambiguity.
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absent in section 220(e) of the New York State Labor Law, which
gave express and unambiguous recognition to this exclusionary prin-
ciple by declaring in part that every contract for or on behalf of
the state or municipality for the construction, alteration and repair of
any public building or public work shall contain provisions obligating
every contractor and sub-contractor and persons acting on their
behalf not to discriminate against any citizen of the State of New
York.16 The enactment of fair employment practices acts has removed
all distinction between citizens and aliens by the inclusion of the
term "individual" or "person."'
Even when a traditional statute contained broad language in terms
of the avenues of employment and grounds of discrimination, it
would also contain limiting provisions which devitalized its effect.
Such a statute, section 43 of the New York Civil Rights Law, pro-
hibits labor organizations from practicing discrimination on the basis
of race, color or creed in the admission of members or in the
designation of members to employers for employment, promotion or
dismissal. This section bans discrimination; whether it be effected by
ritualistic practices, constitutional or by-law prescripton or by the
tacit agreement of its members. However, under section 41 only
officers and representatives of a labor organization personally guilty
of discrimination and not the organization itself were subject to
punishment. This permitted individual business agents of unions to
be replaced, leaving union policies unchanged. 8 Under the fair
employment practices acts, unions or any entity, corporate or other-
wise, may be enjoined, and upon failure to comply, are subject to
liability for damages and fines.' 9
16. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 220(e), originally applicable only to state or municipal contracts
"for the construction, alteration or repair of any public building or public work," has
been amended to cover "contracts for the manufacture, sale or distribution of material,
equipment or supplies." N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 424 (McKinney 1958).
17. Fair employment practices statutes represented a major change. Among the
states prohibiting discrimination in war defense contracts and public works prior to
1945, it was not unusual to restrict protection to citizens only. See, e.g., ILL. RPv.
STAT. ch. 24, §§ 24(1)-(8) (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. ch. 270 (1933); NFB. RELv. STAT.
§ 144 (1943).
18. Contrast this with the strict statutes in force in Pennsylvania and Kansas prior to
1945. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.3(f) (1941), provided that any labor organization
"by ritualistic practice, constitutional or by-law prescription, by tacit agreement among
its members, or otherwise, denies a person or persons membership in its organization
on account of race, creed or color .. " is not deemed a labor organization for the
purpose of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-2461-63
(1949) (originally enacted in 1941), forbade any labor organization which discriminates
against any person or excludes from membership on account of race, color or creed any
person from membership to act as a collective bargaining representative in the state,
except those subject to the Railway Labor Act. 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63,
81-88 (1958).
19. N.Y. ExzcuTnrv LAW § 297.
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B. Structure, Composition and Budget
The newly formed commissions were confronted, inter alia, with
the need for formulating their organizational structure and determin-
ing their function, composition and budgetary requirements as well
as a locus of operation. These were necessary for the immediate
implementation of their direct statutory responsibilities of preventing
discrimination by means of supportive programs and services.
Statutes of some independently established commissions expressly
require that the principal office of the commission be located at the
state capital; other statutes provide for this by necessary implication.20
Enforcement agencies in Oregon, Wisconsin and New Jersey operate
within existing state agencies, and therefore their principal offices
coincide with those of their respective parent agencies located in the
capital cities of the states.2' Further, many statutes authorize in
general terms the establishment of additional commission offices as the
circumstances of agency expansion from time to time require. In
any case, the right to do so may be interpreted as being implicit in the
statutes.22
It is apparent that the scope and dimension of transition from the
statutory creature, to an operating administrative organization would
be more extensive with respect to the newly created and totally inde-
pendent commissions, of which New York's is a prime example, than
those commissions which function within presently established and ex-
perienced bureaus, departments or divisions.2 3 The independent com-
20. The statutes of New York and Pennsylvania which are representative of the
many establishing independent commissions, contain the typical phraseology: "To
establish and maintain its principal office in the city of Albany...." N.Y. ExEcUTIVE
La-w § 295(1); "To establish and maintain a central office in the city of Harris-
burg .. " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 957(a) (1964). Statutes of other jurisdictions
creating independently established commissions, such as that of Colorado, make no
reference to the establishment of a main office of the commission. This may have
been deemed unnecessary owing to two conjunctive factors: the prior history of civil
rights operations and enforcement centered at the state capital, and the need of only
one agency office for the state. California merely authorizes its commission to estab-
lish a principal office to afford flexibility of choice through experience. CAL. LAnOn
CODE § 1419(a). The commissions of New Mexico and Rhode Island, although inde-
pendently established, would maintain their principal office in the state capital apart
from statute. There the offices of the Labor and Industrial Commissioners who are
charged with enforcing the respective acts are situated.
21. New Jersey-NJ. REV. STAT. § 18:25-71-10 (1963); Oregon-administered by
the Bureau of Labor. ORE. REv. STAT. § 659,090(1) (1957); Wisconsin-"shall be
administered by the Industrial Commissioner." Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.33-.38 (1957).
22. Thus, while there is no express authorization in the Pennsylvania statute to set
up additional offices, the provision "to meet and function at any place within the
Commonwealth" implicitly grants that power. PA. STAT. Ai'". tit. 43, § 957(b)
(1964). Only Illinois has statutorily provided for an additional office outside the
principal one in Chicago. ILL. 1Ev. STAT. ch. 48, § 856(b) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
23. In Oregon, the FEPA is administered by an elected public official, the Com-
missioner of Labor in the Civil Rights Division, Bureau of Labor; in Wisconsin, the
[ VOL. 18
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missions were singularly confronted with the choice of adopting either
a centralized or decentralized form of administrative control. Under
the former approach, commission administrative operations and activ-
ities would be centered in a single agency office, while the latter
approach envisaged the establishment of commission offices through-
out the state, each to serve a particular geographical area, thus
relegating to the principal office, primarily, the responsibilities of state-
wide planning and administration. Apart from budgetary limitations,
the decisions as to centralized or decentralized control among the
states rested upon what was deemed to achieve maximum commission
effectiveness. Factors such as population makeup, density, numbers,
size of metropolitan urban communities, immigration trends, rate of
industrial expansion, and variations of attitude toward equality of
opportunity were considered.
24
The functions of the principal offices of all commissions appear to
fall within three divisible and correlative classes of activities-ad-
ministrative (including public relations, research and statistics), edu-
cational and legal.25 The larger independent commissions, such as
those of New York and Pennsylvania, have given the greatest recog-
nition to the specialized functions of these activities; New York's
commission has been foremost in this regard. The New York Com-
mission operates through three major divisions headed respectively
by an executive director for administration, a director of education,
and a general counsel; it also has given separate recognition to the
research function, which has divisional status. In addition, the regula-
tory activities (processing of complaints), originally a function of the
legal division, have also been divisionalized. 26 Other commissions,
such as Ohio's, have no separate legal division; the legal function is
incorporated into the administrative division, and some of the respon-
sibility falls upon the legal staff of the state Attorney General's Depart-
ment.27 Rhode Island's commission exemplifies another arrangement:
the supervisor of education, an executive, operates under the agency's
administrative head, and legal assistance is obtained from the Attor-
State Industrial Commission as a body administers the act within the Division of Fair
Employment Practices. New Jersey is somewhat at variance, as the New Jersey Law
is under the direction of an Assistant Commissioner of Education, Division of Civil
Rights, Department of Education.
24. For a brief statement on this subject by a commission, see OEo CIV. RTs.
COMb'N, 1960 ANN. REP. 16.
25. N.Y. SCAD, 1957 RE'. PnoG. 34-36. New York has also provided a separate
division of housing, a trend all commissions will likely be required to take with the
addition and growth of more judicial responsibilities.
26. Ibid.
27. Onto Civ. RTs. CoMM'N, 1960 ANN. R:P. 19. A lack of a commission research
staff has been in evidence. The commission has thus, on occasion, requested legal
research assistance from the State University School of Law. Id. at 33.
1965 ]
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ney Generars office. Thus, none of the specialized personnel are
departmentalized.2
Administrative control varies from state to state. In New York,
the General Counsel, head of the legal division, enjoys equal status
with the Executive Secretary, the administrative head of the commis-
sion, and the several division heads. Only the General Counsel bears
a staff relationship with the commissioners, to whom all are sub-
ordinate.2 9 The Pennsylvania Commission places the head of its
legal division under the control of the executive director, the adminis-
trative head. The chief of the legal division, however, is made co-
equal with the director of research (education) who is similarly
under executive control.30 Ohio places its executive director, the chief
administrative officer, directly over the entire commission, giving no
department or division status to the legal function; the executive
director is responsible only to the commissioners. This represents the
prevailing pattern.31 We may note that some of the larger commissions
provide for an assistant to the administrative head, giving him
extensive authority. Ohio and Pennsylvania, for example, place all
field representatives directly under his supervision; he has the addi-
tional responsibility of directing his own regional office. 32 In New
York, the regional offices are now under the supervision of local
regional directors answerable directly to the executive secretary of
the commission.
33
All principal offices of the state commissions function both as
central offices providing statewide directional control and as regional
offices. Administratively, this statewide control includes responsibil-
ities for training and supervision of all field representatives; procuring,
maintaining, and supplying of all equipment; preparing and operating
the annual budget; and laying down of operational regulations and
policies.
34
28. R.I. FEPC, 1961 ANN. REP. 3.
29. On March 6, 1963, at an interview with an associate counsel of the commission
at the New York offices, it was his opinion that the general counsel informally bad
greater status than the division heads. The intra-agency influence of the legal division
in New York is apparently unequaled among state commissions.
30. PA. FEPC, 1957 A . REP. App. I, 24.
31. Omo Civ. RTs. Co'mur, 1960 ANN. REP. 19; PA. FEPC, 1960 ANN. REp.
App. I, 24.
32. Ibid.
33. N.Y. SCAD, 1957 Ban. PROG. 34-37.
34. The principal office of the commission is not necessarily the most active.
Thus, Albany is statutorily the principal site of the New York State agency; functionally,
however, the center of statewide policy and executive control is New York City.
In addition, the New York City office serves the metropolitan area as a regional
office and sustains the greatest caseload. N.Y. SCAD, 1957 REP. PRoC. 34-36.
Similarly, the principal office of the Pennsylvania FEPC is at Harrisburg and
sustains a relatively light caseload as compared with the regional offices in Philadelphia
[ VOL. 18
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The functions of many commissions are not necessarily confined to
commission offices. Investigation, conferences and conciliation meet-
ings between complainants and respondents, educational consultations
with trade, labor and public utility associations, exploratory visits to
the public; in fact, the entire gamut of commission activities are
undertaken in various sections of the state.3
Regional offices typically operate under broadly formulated policies
set forth by the commission and carry out their programs in geo-
graphical areas admittedly large in terms of their available facilities.
Regional directors are equipped to receive, process, and conciliate
charges of employment discrimination as is the principal office of
the commission. They develop and organize-in cooperation with
community councils and advisory agencies within their territorial
jurisdiction-all facets of the educational programs in conjunction with
employment agencies, labor organizations and the general public.36
The activities engaged in by the commission itself are latgely
based upon programs of education, both formal and informal,
coordinated with existing public and private agencies on a statewide
level. However, the educational activities conducted by the concilia-
tion councils and advisory agencies are deemed of prime importance
in the educational effort of the commission. The former groups are
composed of interested and respected citizens recruited on a local
level, serving without compensation other than expenses, and em-
powered by the commission to do one or more of the following: to
study and make recommendations concerning discrimination; to foster
cooperation among specialized groups and the general public; and to
reduce group prejudice by means of the employment of all mass
media, including the local distribution of commission literature.37 It is
to be noted that New York rejects the principle (which is a require-
ment of many commissions) of choosing members who are identified
with a particular group or organization, but rather endeavors to ap-
and Pittsburgh. Unlike the New York City office, however, the Harrisburg office
remains the center of statewide FEP control. We may note that the Philadelphia
and Pittsburgh municipal Commissions on Human Eights have borne the greater case-
load burden within these municipal areas than the state agency. The Philadelphia
commission until two years ago had a larger staff than the Philadelphia office of the
state agency.
35. FEP statutes creating independent commissions such as those of New York and
Pennsylvania typically provide for the commissions "to meet and function at any
place within the state." N.Y. ExEzuTivE LAw § 295(2); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
957 (1964); N.Y. SCAD, 1946 ANN. REP. 4.
36. For a brief commission description of the functions of principal and regional
offices, see N.Y. SCAD, 1946 ANN. Ra. 4. See also OHao ComM'N, supra note 24,
at 17, for a description of the responsibilities of a regional office.
37. For an excellent description of the educational objectives of conciliation or com-
munity councils, see N.Y. SCAD, 1946 ANN. REP. 19-22.
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point as members of the conciliation councils persons who are
representative of their communities. 38
The functions of the legal division or staffs liaisoned to the com-
missions by the Attorney General's office include the following:
advising the commission and staff in all legal and investigative phases
of their work; preparing memoranda of law and advisory opinions on
legal questions; collecting selected legal material relating to discrimi-
nation; cooperating with government agencies in furthering the
purposes of the law against discrimination. 39
The laws of Hawaii and Oregon are administered under one-man
supervision, the heads of their state labor departments serving the
same functions as commissioners in other states.40 Elsewhere, commis-
sion membership varies widely from three each in Massachusetts and
Wisconsin4' to eleven in Missouri.42  Almost uniformly, the com-
missioners are selected by the Governor of the respective state.
Oregon is the exception; the Labor Commissioner sits as an elected
official.43 In Wisconsin, the Industrial Commissioner, who is appointed
by the Governor, sits with two other salaried commissioners. 4 4 New
Jersey's arrangement also varies somewhat from the norm; the state
has a seven-member commission, with only the Commissioner of
Education or his designee possessing investigative and hearing func-
tions.45 None of these intra-departmental commissions is authorized to
appoint counciliation councils, with the exception of that of Oregon.46
38. For an excellent account of the typical growth of the educational phase of com-
mission activity, particularly with respect to the permanent local or regional conciliation
councils, see N.Y. SCAD, 1961 REP'. PROC. 87-88; N.Y. SCAD, 1951 REP. Pitoc. 71-78;
N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP. Pnoc. 74-77; N.Y. SCAD, 19,7 ANN. REP. 19-20; N.Y. SCAD,
1960 REP. PRoG. 85-87; N.Y. SCAD, 1956 REP. PROC. 67-70; N.Y. SCAD, 1955 REP.
PToG. 67-75; N.Y. SCAD, 1954 REP. Pnoc. 67-73. Note that the statute and the
Temporary Commission designated local or regional councils as "conciliation councils."
The Commission, in its reports, refers to them as "Community councils" and, occa-
sionally, "advisory councils," thus placing emphasis on the comprehensive and general
aspect of their functions.
39. N.Y. SCAD, 1946 ANN. REP. 5-6.
40. HArAu REV. STAT. § 9OA-2 (Supp. 1963); ORE. REv. STAT. § 659.060(1)
(1957).
41. MAss. ANN. LAwS ch. 151(B), § 3 (1957). The Industrial Commissioner ad-
ministers the law, and acts as chairman. The commission has three other members.
42. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 296.010(3) (Supp. 1964).
43. ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.060 (1957).
44. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.3(4) (1957). Three member commission with the
Industrial Commissioner as chairman.
45. N.J. STAT. §§ 18:25-8(i) & (e). The Commissioner of Education, a Director of
the Civil Rights Division or an Assistant Commissioner holds hearings and, with the
consent of the Commission, appoints hearing examiners. N.J. STAT. § 18:2,5-70(a)-(e).
The powers of the seven member Commission lie in consultation, research, appointment
of staff, and liaison with the Governor.
46. Wisconsin's statute does not provide for conciliation councils; New Jersey places
authority in the bands of heads of local governments.
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States with independent commissions, except Connecticut, Indiana,
Kansas, Missouri, and Washington, specifically require that commis-
sion selections be approved by the state Senate.4
Commissioners serve terms varying from three to six years, with
the statutes of all independent commissions requiring the terms to
be staggered.
With respect to compensation, the states of New Mexico, Colorado,
and Minnesota provide no salary for their appointed commissioners,
but the latter two states expressly provide for reimbursement of
reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of their duties. New
Mexico makes no such express allowance, but it is implicit. In other
states, commissioners are compensated on a per diem basis. In Con-
necticut, compensation is twenty-five dollars per diem during public
hearings only; while in California compensation is fifty dollars, in
Michigan and Indiana twenty-five dollars, and in Pennsylvania fifteen
dollars per diem for commission services, exclusive of reasonable
expenses incurred.4 Commissioners serving in Hawaii and Oregon are
compensated by virtue of their other offices, while in Wisconsin and
New Jersey, members of the commission are compensated by reason
of services rendered as Industrial Commissioner and Commissioner of
Education, respectively.
Five states have well salaried commissioners who participate sub-
stantially in the three key functions of the agency: finding of probable
cause, formulating terms of conciliation, and participating as a
quasi-administrative court at public hearings. These states are New
York, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Ohio and Rhode Island. New York's
commissioners receive the largest compensation of all, 20,475 dollars
per annum, exclusive of reasonable expenses incurred, and devote full
time to their positions. In addition to the three primary functions of
the commission already mentioned, they are engaged in the super-
vision and conduct of a substantial portion of the investigatory and
counciliatory proceedings as well.49 The observations concerning New
York are applicable to a lesser degree to Wisconsin's two commis-
sioners, exclusive of the Industrial Commissioner, as well as to the
commissioners of Massachusetts, Ohio and Rhode Island. The com-
missioners heading these three commissions may be considered by
47. The many statutory provisions requiring Senate approval do not specify the
votes necessary to constitute approval. The usual rules of legislative procedure apply,
and a majority of a Senate quorum is sufficient. However, Pennsylvania's statute reads
specifically as follows: "commissioner . . . with the advice and consent of two-thirds
of all the members of the Senate .. " PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 956 (1964).
48. CAL. GEN. LAws ANz. § 1416 (Deering 1964); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-124
(1960); Micri. STAT. ANN § 17.458(s) (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 956 (1964).
49. Chairman of the Commission received $25,200; Vice-Chairman, $23,100. An Act
Making Appropriations for the Support of Government, No. 3004, at 17 (1963).
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some as part time, but quantitatively they handle a significant portion
of the agency work load.50
Because many commission appointments offer little or no com-
pensation, appointments are voluntary. Lay commissioners, occupied
with private matters are unable or unwilling to meet more often than
monthly or bi-monthly, so that the actual investigatory and concilia-
tory work load must be placed in the hands of professional staffs.
In these jurisdictions, the commissioners represent the general public
and principally function by laying down broad statewide policies.
Determinations such as a finding of probable cause or the terms of
conciliation are made by the professional staff and are almost uni-
formly upheld when submitted to the full commission for review.5'
The composition of commissions may be considered of some im-
portance. Several of the state statutes have some specific requirement
relating to the allocation of membership along political, geographical
or occupational lines.52 The statutes of Minnesota and Missouri specify
that the commission must include one member from each geographical
district; Colorado's statute, in addition to a political requirement,
contains a rather vague geographical reference.0 The state of Kansas
has approached commission composition along occupational lines. It
provides for proportional representation for management, labor and
the general public.54 The Minnesota commissioners, numbering nine,
not only are limited geographically, but must also have one attorney-
at-law among their number. New Mexico must include the Attorney
General and Labor Commissioner in its five member commission.5"
The theory underlying mandatory political, geographical or occupa-
50. Bamberger & Levin, The Right to Equal Treatment; Administrative Enforce-
ment of Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 74 HARv. L. Rv. 51 (1961).
51. ibid.
52. IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2310 (Supp. 1964): Not more than 3 members from
the same political party. MicH. STAT. ANt. § 17.458(5) (1955): Also not more than
3 members from the same political party-remainder opposite party. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 956 (1964): Not more than 5 members of the same political party. ILL. ANn.
STAT. ch. 48, § 855 (Smith-Hurd 1961): Not more than 3 from same political party,
and must be a resident for 5 years past. Mmn. STAT. § 363.04 (1957); 9 Members, one
from each Congressional district and one Attorney at Law. See also notes 53, 54 &
55 infra.
53. CowO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-19-4 (1954). "Appointments shall be made to provide
geographical area representation insofar as may be practicable." "No more than four
members belonging to the same political party." Mo. H. Bill 226, 70th Gen. Assembly,
§ 2. "It shall consist of eleven members, one from each Congressional District of this
state." MmN. STAT. § 363.04 (1957). ". . . one for each Congressional district ...0
54. KAt. GEaN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1003 (Supp. 1961). "Said commission shall consist
of five (5) members, two (2) of whom shall be representative of industry, two (2)
of whom shall be representative of labor, and one (1) of whom shall be from the
public at large."
55. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-4-6 (1953), "[One of whom shall be the duly elected
and qualified Attorney General of the state ... and one of whom shall be the duly
appointed, qualified and acting Labor Commissioner of the state."
E VeOL. 18
FAIR EMPLOYMENT COMMISSIONS
tional qualifications is that these requirements will encourage diversity
of opinion and allay charges of partiality or bias. Many of the states,
however, have rejected this rationale as unsound in principle and
practice. The New York Temporary Commission, viewing the subject
of discrimination as one of general public concern, rejected the many
suggestions advanced for the allocation of the membership of the
Commission along special interest lines, and chose to place unfettered
discretion in the Governor.
56
The size of the commission staff and the extent of its operations are
dependent upon the availability of funds. There is a great variation
among the states in this respect, ranging from one and one-half million
dollars per annum for New York to 2,000 dollars per annum for New
Mexico.57 The wide budgetary differences are attributable to the
variable factors of size, density of population, employment activity,
number, kind and distribution of minority population, and degree
of discrimination present within the respective states. It is important
to keep in mind that, of the several approaches which may be used in
analyzing budgetary figures, that which views commission allocations
as they relate to total state and per capita expenditures is more mean-
ingful than a comparison of the absolute amounts among the states.
In any event, on the basis of the annual reports of the states, one may
conclude that the commissions are hard put to do the "most effective
work," particularly in the face of intensified commission efforts and
activities due to over-increasing jurisdictional responsibilities.
III. COVERAGE PROBLEMS
The New York statutes define "employer" in negative terms. The
term covers all employers except a "club exclusively social, or a frater-
nal, charitable, educational or religious association or corporation ...
not organized for private profit."5 8 According to the New York Tem-
porary Commission, it embraces, in its positive sense, the commonly
accepted dictionary meaning.59 Some fair employment practices acts
adopt the New York exemption in toto, while others, such as those of
Rhode Island and Missouri, do so with slight modification. Thus,
while Rhode Island's act largely follows the New York exemption,
it further excludes, by express language, labor and non-sectarian
organizations and associations engaged in social work.6° Other acts,
56. N.Y. ThMp. SCAD, 1945 ANN. REP. 28.
57. An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of Government, No. 3004, at
17 (1963).
58. N.Y. ExxcuTmE LAw § 292(5).
59. N.Y. TEmp. SCAD, 1945 ANN. REP.
60. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-5-3(b) (1957); Mo. REv. STAT. 296.010(2) (Supp.
1964). Missouri simply excludes corporations and associations owned and operated by
religious or sectarian groups.
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such as those of Minnesota and Colorado, markedly deviate from the
New York prototype and substantially minimize the scope of exemp-
tion. Thus, Minnesota exempts religious and fraternal corporations and
associations "when religion shall be a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion for employment."61 The acts of Colorado and Pennsylvania
exempt these organizations only when they are totally non-government
supported.62 The acts of Michigan, Ohio and Connecticut provide
total exemption from the above mentioned exceptions.
63
Commissions have sought to interpret express exempt categories in
terms of substance rather than form in order to limit their application.
They have tended, for example, to closely scrutinize certificates of in-
corporation and articles of association to determine whether the prac-
tices of these entities are in substantial conformity with their stated
purposes. 64 Thus, questions as to whether they are "non-profit" or
supported "in whole or in part" by governmental appropriations will
be determined from a primarily factual as opposed to a technical
standpoint.
The scope of limitation in the area of explicit exemptions remains,
however, a determination for the court. In the only court challenge
to this end, the New York Commission sought to bring educational
institutions within the purview of the Law Against Discrimination.
The case of Matter of the Board of Higher Education v. Carter" arose
out of an informal investigation by the New York Commission of
religious discrimination in promotion and employment at Queens
College, one of several municipal colleges under the jurisdiction of
that Board. The Board brought a proceeding to restrain the Com-
mission's continuance of its investigation on the ground that the
Board, under the Education Law, was an educational "body corpo-
rate," a corporation not organized for profit, and thus expressly
excluded from the term "employer." Inclusion is essential both to the
enforceable jurisdiction of the commission under a verified complaint,
and to the initiation of its investigation under an informal complaint.
61. Mmn. STAT. § 363.02 (1957).
62. COLO. REv. STAT. AN. § 81-19-2(5) (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§954(b) (1964).
63. CONN. REv. STAT. § 31-122 (1958); McH. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(2)(b) (1960);
Omo REv. CODE § 4112.01(B) (Baldwin 1964).
64. Matter of Castle Hill Beach Club v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 142 N.Y.S.2d 432
(Sup. Ct. 1955). The court held that the commission has the power to lift he corpo-
rate veil to ascertain the facts with respect to the true status of a petitioner. It said:
"If the petitioner is correct, then the Civil Rights Lawv and the Executive Law creating
the commission could be rendered completely ineffective by any individual or group
using the guise of a membership corporation. It would result in the emasculation of
the statute involved and substitute for substance the fetish of form."
65. 26 Misc. 2d 989, 213 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1961), modified, 16 App. Div. 2d 443,
228 N.Y.S.2d 704, modified, 14 N.Y.2d 138, 250 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1964).
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The lower court held that the Commission lacked both enforceable and
investigative jurisdiction. The Commission, asserting that public non-
profit educational institutions were "employers" within the meaning
of the statute, and hence subject to the enforceable jurisdiction of the
Commission, appealed. The appellate division held that the plain
language of the statute precluded enforceable jurisdiction and that the
legislative history required this result. The court reasoned that while
the legislature was aware of the wide powers held by the Regents
and State Commissioners of Education with respect to religious and
ethnic discrimination in the public schools of the state, it failed to
indicate an intent to transfer this power to the Commission. The
court held, however, that the Commission had jurisdiction to investi-
gate informally for purposes of research and study.
The two vigorous dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens and
Steuer are enlightening. Justice Stevens reasoned syllogistically that,
inasmuch as the preamble to the law declared the statute to be in
fulfillment of the provisions of the New York State Constitution
(Article 1, section II), and inasmuch as this provision prohibits dis-
crimination because of race, color, creed or religion "by the state or
any agency or subdivision of the state," and, further, inasmuch as the
Board of Higher Education is statutorily declared to be a state agency
the Board is an "employer" falling without the statutory exemption.
The learned justice buttressed his argument with legislative history
and broad public policy objectives. Justice Steuer, while embracing
Justice Stevens' rationale, concluded that the Board of Higher Educa-
tion was not a corporation under the statute. The term "corporation'
under the statute refers to private business corporations, not govern-
mental entities. The court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge Bergan,
held for the commission, stating:
If the constitutional interdiction of discrimination in civil rights by the
State or any State agency or subdivision be kept in mind and read with the
provisions of section 291 of the statute which declares the opportunity for
employment "without discrimination because of race, creed, color or national
origin" is "a civil right," it becomes clear that the "general jurisdiction and
power" of the commission to "eliminate and prevent discrimination in em-
ployment" attaches to all public agencies; and it would be reasonable to
expect that all public agencies would yield readily to a legislative policy
thus distinctly laid down.66
In holding the exemption did not apply, the court relied heavily on
legislative history indicating that educational agencies of the state
were intended to assist, not impede, the commission.
As to this question in other fair employment practices jurisdictions,
66. 14 N.Y.2d at 145-46, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
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New Jersey, Massachusetts, California and Oregon, with exemption
provisions similar to those of New York-that is exempting from the
term "employer" educational associations or corporations not organized
for private profit-have entertained verified complaints against public
educational institutions without judicial challenge. In California
and Oregon, legal opinions have been rendered. An opinion by the
Counsel of the California Fair Employment Practices Commission has
concluded that when its statute used the words "private profit" it
intended to make only a distinction between private institutions
operated for profit and private institutions not operated for profit. The
exemption is given to the latter. In Oregon, the Attorney General has
rendered an opinion that school districts do not fall within the
"association or corporation . . . not organized for private profit"
exemption.6
7
A number of important case rulings have given some clarification
to the subject of commission jurisdiction over employers.
The question of the amenability of agencies of foreign governments
to the jurisdiction of the courts and thereby of the commission has
been raised in New York by the filing of a verified complaint against
the British Information Service-an agency of the British government-
charging an unlawful employment practice in the use of employ-
ment application forms.61 The Commission, while obtaining voluntary
compliance on the part of the foreign employer, adopted the following
principles concerning a foreign employer's assertion of immunity. The
Commission will not take jurisdiction if, upon a claim of immunity,
the foreign employer applies to the United States Department of State
for issuance of a "suggestion of immunity" upon which the court will
not entertain jurisdiction. Under the principle of restricted immu-
nity,69 the State Department must state that the employer is a
sovereign nation, as distinguished from an agent or instrumentality,
and is engaged in public and governmental functions as distinguished
from private or commercial transactions.
Further, regarding sovereign immunity, well established principles
of law hold that the federal government, its agencies and instrumental-
67. Brief for Appellant, pp. 92-96, Matter of Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Carter,
supra note 65; Op. CALIF. FEPC CouNsEL, DEPr. OF INDUS. R.ELATIONS, File No. 183
(May 31, 1960); Record, pp. 29-30, Matter of Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Carter, supra
note 65; Op. ORE. AT'ry GEN. No. 118 (Aug. 3, 1949); Record, p. 2.31, Matter of
Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Carter, supra note 65.
68. N.Y. SCAD, 1956 REP. PNoG. 92-94.
69. This represents a restrictive theory of immunity. The immunity of the sovereign
is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts of a state, but not with respect
to private acts. This is in contrast with the classical or absolute theory, in which a
sovereign cannot without its consent be made a respondent in the court of another
sovereign. The restrictive theory represents the present policy of the U.S. State Depart-
ment. DzPT. OF STATE BULL., No. 984-5 [June 23, 1952].
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ities are not amenable to the jurisdiction of a state agency.70 How-
ever, mere technical federal control, with operations and policies left
largely in private hands, may be insufficient to confer immunity.
Thus the New York Commission has ruled that a steamship company
whose vessels have been taken over by the United States War Ship-
ping Administration under a general agency agreement stands, with
respect to the New York Law Against Discrimination, in the nature
of the private employer in regard to employees working aboard such
vessels. Further, the mere fact that a steamship company operates in
interstate and foreign commerce does not give such employer a cloak
of immunity. The Commission reasoned that the application of the
Law Against Discrimination to employment practices in the maritime
field is a permissible exercise of state power. It does not violate either
the admiralty and maritime clause or the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution, nor interfere with the enforcement of
existing federal law regulating employment in the maritime field.
71
The railroads have also been the subject of important commission
rulings in the field of interstate commerce. The New York Commission,
reasoning along the lines of the maritime rulings, concluded that
railroads, although engaged in interstate commerce, are subject to its
jurisdiction; that since the Law Against Discrimination is a constitu-
tional act in the exercise of the state police power, it does not place
a burden upon interstate commerce or conflict with existing federal
legislation.
72
Several jurisdictions fail specifically to include the state and its
respective political subdivisions within the meaning of the term
"employer." This omission could well result in a lack of jurisdiction
of state commissions over the entire range of state public employment
agencies, as well as state employment service, and the power to
command by subpoena state files, records and books for investigative
purposes. New York and other fair employment practices states,
though cognizant of the well recognized canon of construction that in
the absence of express statutory inclusion or necessary statutory impli-
cation, the sovereign is not deemed to be affected by a statute, have
70. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 lRP. Pato. 33. Despite the lack of jurisdiction, the Commis-
sion's policy is to eliminate the discriminatory practices by conferring with and bringing
the grievance to the attention of the appropriate agency of the Federal government.
71. N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP. PnoG. 43. This view is largely vindicated by Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963), upholding
application of the Colorado statute to hiring practices of an interstate carrier. The
Commission ruling was reportedly based on six cases: Brown v. Weyerhauser Steamship
Co.; Jackson v. Weyerhauser Steamship Co.; Austin v. Weyerhauser Steamship Co.;
Clarke v. American President Lines, Ltd.; Hoyt v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.; Waters
v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.
72. N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP,. PRo. 44. See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 293 N.Y.
315, 56 N.E.2d 721 (1944), aff'd, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
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interpreted the public policy statement of their preambles as clearly
supportive of state inclusion.
73
The full implication of state inclusion as an "employer" has yet to
be clarified. The statement by the Court of Appeals in the Carter
decision, quoted above, that state agencies are within the jurisdiction
of the State Commission Against Discrimination, raises the broader
question as to the extent of commission jurisdiction over the entire
state system. That this matter is far from academic may be shown
by a recent lower court decision.74 Petitioner filed a complaint with
the New York Commission, alleging a conspiracy between the Mayor
of the City of New York and four Councilmen from the Borough of
Manhattan to elect only a member of the negro race to the office of
Borough President of Manhattan. The Commission, in dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ruled that elective office does not
constitute employment within the meaning of the law. Justice
Epstein, holding that the determination of the commission was proper,
dismissed the petition. The determination of Justice Epstein was
unanimously affirmed by the appellate division. A further appeal to
the court of appeals was denied.
7 5
The New York statute defines "employee" negatively, and no fair
employment practices statute has defined, nor has any commission
formally described, what is positively and inclusively meant by the
term "employee." The interpretation of the New York Temporary
Commission of the term "employer7-i.e., the normally acceptable
and dictionary meaning of the term-is similarly applicable to "em-
ployee." 76 Does this refer to the common law definition? Commission
rulings have specifically recognized the common law definition in
distinguishing employees from independent contractors. Thus, in
Chastang v. Houghton, the Commission ruled that six real estate sales-
men associated with brokers are not employees but independent con-
tractors under the common law. As authority, the Commission cited
Matter of Wilson-Sullivan Company,17 where the court held that the
designation in the Real Property Law of real estate salesmen as
"employees" did not change their status under common law as
"independent contractors."
An exempt category in New York is an employer with "fewer than
six persons in his employ."78 All fair employment practices states
except Wisconsin and Hawaii exempt employers with less than a
73. N.Y. SCAD, 1945 REP. PaoG. 28.
74. Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Dudley, 29 Misc.
2d 710, 222 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
75. 14 App. Div. 2d 596, 214 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1961).
76. N.Y. SCAD, 1945 ANN. REP. 28.
77. 263 App. Div. 162, 33 N.Y.S.2d 203 (1942).
78. N.Y. ExEcunvE LAw § 290(5).
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minimum number of employees, ranging from four in such states as
Rhode Island, Ohio and New Mexico, to fifty in Illinois. 9  Both
broad and limited interpretations have been given. Illustrative of the
former is the ruling by the New York Commission that employees in
all units of a multi-establishment employer are to be counted in
determining the requisite number, provided such units are under the
control of one parent organization or corporation."
Indicative of the difficulty in interpreting the language are rulings
of the New York State Commission that a spouse can not be included
in the minimum number8' and that active officers of the corporation
are to be counted as employees. 82 Other interesting questions have
been informally posed to commissions. One-whether a commission
would take jurisdiction if it found the total number of different
persons employed during the year exceeded the statutory minimum-
was answered in the affirmative by Michigan and New York.83 An-
other-whether in the absence of statutory direction all the employees
making up the necessary minimum are required to work within the
state-was answered in the negative by the New York Commission.84
The statutes of Michigan, Illinois, Ohio and New Mexico have by
express provision provided otherwise.8 5
Another express exclusion is provided for employees in the "domes-
tic service of another" under all of the fair employment practices
statutes except those of Wisconsin and Missouri. 6 A large number of
79. A.A. CODE tit. 18, § 3(5) (1953) (ten or more); CAL. GEr. LAws AN-. §
1413(d) (Deering 1964) (five or more); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-19-4 (1953)
(six or more); CONN. GNm. STAT. ANN. § 31-122(f) (1961) (five or more); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, § 852 (Smith-Hurd 1961) (one hundred or more, after Dec. 31, 1962,
seventy-five or more, after Dec. 31, 1964, fifty or more); KAN. GE . STAT. ANN. §
44-1002 (Supp. 1961) (eight or more); MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 151(B), § 1(5) (1957)
(five or more); Miona. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(2)(b) (1955) (eight or more); Mm.
STAT. ANN. § 363.02(2) (1957) (eight or more); Mo. REv. STAT. 296.010(3) (Supp.
1964) (fifty or more); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-4-3(d) (1933) (four or more); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18-25-5(3) (1963) (six or more); Omo REv. CODE § 4112.01(b)
(1959) (four or more); ORE. REv. STAT. § 659.010(6) (1957) (six or more); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(b) (1964) (twelve or more); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §
28-5-6(b) (1957) (four or more); WAsir. REv. CODE ANN. tit. 49, § 60.040 (1962)
(eight or more).
80. N.Y. SCAD, 1945 ANN. REP. 55.
81. N.Y. SCAD, 1951 REP. PoO. 30.
82. Id. at 26.
83. Michigan would take jurisdiction if the total number of different persons em-
ployed during the year exceeded the statutory minimum, while New York deems it
sufficient that six persons were employed at any one time near date. N.Y. SCAD,
1955 REP. PROG. 28.
84. N.Y. SCAD, 1955 REP. PRoc. 27-28 (Smith v. Illinois Shade Cloth, Inc.).
85. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 852(d) (Smith-Hurd 1961); MicE. STAT. ANN. §
17.458(2) (1955); Omo REv. CODE § 4112.01(B) (1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
49-4-3(d) (1953).
86. N.Y. ExEcuT LAw § 292(5). New York phraseology is typical: "... or in
the domestic service of another . . ." CA.L. GEN. LAws ANN. § 1413(c) (Deering
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states exclude employees who are parents, spouses or children of their
employers.8 7 The statutes of California, Illinois and Pennsylvania also
provide for the exclusion of agricultural employees.88
The term "domestic" has been the subject of interpretation by the
commissions, including those in New York and Pennsylvania, where
the common law definition is applied. There, a domestic is one who
performs the usual menial duties pertaining to a house or household.
This definition clearly does not include, by its terms, an employee
working in a commercial hotel, factory or office building; his em-
ployer is, therefore, subject to the statute.8 9 A Pennsylvania ruling
has held that a housemother employed by a men's college fraternity,
although employed within a household, was a non-domestic since she
engaged in duties of a supervisory or managerial nature.90
With regard to the meaning of agricultural employees exempt from
commission jurisdiction, California's statutory exemption is restricted
to those agricultural workers who "live in" only. Pennsylvania's exemp-
tion, and that of Illinois (whose term "agricultural labor" is defined by
the State Unemployment Compensation Act) should follow Cali-
fornia's restriction on live-ins to be consistent with the intent to make
the very sensitive relationship associated with this employment free
from public control.91
"Employment agency" has been construed broadly. The New York
definition, "any person undertaking to procure employees or opportu-
nities to work,"92 has been incorporated into the statutes of some
states. Missouri's statute restricts the term to commercial agencies.
Other jurisdictions, seeking to avoid ambiguity, included the phrase
"with or without compensation," and thus explicitly removed any
distinction between commercial and non-commercial agencies 3 In
1964), ". .. or in the domestic service of any person in the home... ." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, § 852(cy (Smith-Hurd 1961), ... does not include domestic servants
in private homes .. "
87. The typical phraseology of these statutes is "... do not include any individual
employed by his parents, spouse or child . . ." N.Y. ExEcUTIVE LAw § 292(c).
88. CAL. Gm. LAws ANN. § 1413(f) (Deering 1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. oh. 48, §
852(2)(c) (Smith-Hurd 1961); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(b) (1964).
89. PA. FEDA, 1958 INTERP. RUL. 2.
90. ibid.
91. CAL. FEPC, 1960 ANN. REP. 11 ("agricultural workers residing on the land
where they are employed as farm workers"). CAL. GEr. STAT. ANN. § 1413(3)
(Deering 1964). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. oh. 48, § 852(c) (Smith-Hurd 1961).
92. N.Y. ExECUTrvE LAw § 292(a). The New York definition standing alone would
appear to include every type of employment agency regardless of the nature of its
business. Its commission has ruled, however, that employment agencies which confine
their business exclusively to the placement of persons in domestic service are not sub-
ject to the law.
93. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 296.010(5) (1965), "includes any person undertaking for com-
pensation to procure opportunities to work or to procure, recruit, refer, or place
employees." "'Employment agency' includes any person regularly undertaking with
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New York, it was understood by the Temporary Commission that
the term would not be restricted to employment agencies engaged in
business for compensation or profit 4 Subsequent rulings by the
permanent Commission have formalized this early pronouncement.
Commissions have given content to this area. It has been held
that a private business school attempting to place its graduates in
employment without charge constitutes an employment agency.95
Charitable, community and professional organizations, although non-
profit, come within the statutes insofar as they operate as an employ-
ment agency. 6 Appointment officers or placement bureaus of univer-
sities which undertake to find employment, full or part time, without
charge for their students and graduates similarly fall within the ambit
of this definition.97
Traditionally established and widely acknowledged discrimination
in trade unions, in which non-membership frequently bars job seekers
from opportunities for employment or apprenticeship training, requires
that all commissions be provided under their statutes with explicit
jurisdiction over labor unions. The New York statute provides that
the term "labor organization" includes any organization which exists
and is constituted for the purpose, in whole or in part, of collective
bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning grievances, terms
or conditions of employment, or of other mutual aid or protection in
connection with employment.9 Some jurisdictions incorporate the
New York definition,99 while others modify it by omitting the phrase
"and is constituted for the purpose."'10 This omission raises the ques-
tion of whether a labor union under this modified phraseology must
not only function for one of the stated purposes, but must have been
formed for these intended purposes.
The reasons expressed in the report of the New York State Tem-
or without compensation. . . . Ormo REV. CODE § 4112.01(e) (1959). See also ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 483, § 852(e) (Smith-Hurd 1961); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(1)(e)
(1955); MINN. STAT. § 363.01(4) (1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(e) (1964).
94. N.Y. T.EMP. SCAD, REP. PROC. § 127(2).
95. N.Y. SCAD, 1952 REP. PRoo. 29 (Harris v. Utt d/b/a Florence Utt Switchboard
Schools).
96. N.Y. SCAD, REP. PnoG. 26.
97. PA. FEPA, 1958 ITrrnp. RUL. 2.
98. N.Y. ExEcuTivE LAw § 292(3). The definition of "labor organization" is sub-
stantially the same as that in the New York State Labor Relations Act. N.Y. LAB. LAw
§ 701(5).
99. Arsc STAT. § 23.25.040 (1962); CAL. GEN. LAws ANN. § 1410 (Deering
1964); MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 151(B), § 1 (1957); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-4-1 (1953).
100. "The term labor organization' includes any organization which exists for the
purpose, in whole or in part, of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, terms or conditions of employment or of other mutual aid or
protection in relation to employment." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(d) (1964).
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porary Commission Against Discrimination for its failure to recom-
mend to the legislature the broadest statutory coverage of employers
and employees are suggestive and explanatory of similar omissions
among other fair employment practices jurisdictions.
In support of exemptions generally, legislative stratagem played
an important role: namely, the fear that without limitation of the
scope of coverage, the Law Against Discrimination would not pass.
Beyond this negative historical factor, the framers conceived the
philosophy and approach to fair employment practices legislation as
one of education rather than punishment, and sought to leave em-
ployers within exempt categories to adhere voluntarily to statutory
standards.'10
In particular, exemptions in support of non-profit fraternal, chari-
table, religious and educational organizations and associations' 02-
the general categories of exemption-were viewed by the commission
as desirable in light of the complicated and delicate questions con-
cerning constitutionality and religious preference which would have
arisen in failing to provide for these exemptions. 10 3
In principle, however, any distinction between commercial and
non-profit institutions only strengthens the desirability of placing
the latter under legal protection. They are predicated upon respect
for the dignity of man and are looked upon by the community as the
leaders in fostering the high ideals of equality of treatment. Educa-
tional institutions, in particular, profess and instruct such respect.
Violence to principle results when licenses and tax exemptions-govern-
mental privileges-are bestowed upon institutions which are permitted
by statute to violate at will the fundamental right of every person to
earn a livelihood on the basis of job equality-a right declared by
fair employment practices statutes or constitutional declaration to be
the public policy of the state. 0 4 It is unjustifiedly discriminatory to
deny the protection afforded by this legislation to the large number
of persons employed within these exempt categories, many of whom
are Jews, Negroes and Catholics, members of the very minority
groups the statutes seek to protect.
The fears associated with the need for requiring minimum numbers
of employees'05 were also commented upon by the New York Tem-
porary Commission. In exempting employers with fewer than six
employees from statutory restrictions, the commission justified its
action on the basis of "practical administration." The Commission
I01. N.Y. TEMP. SCAD, 1945 ANN. REPt. § 130(4).
102. Ibid.
103. Id. § 127(7), at 28.
104. Ibid.
105. ibid.
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reasoned that too many problems of an administrative nature would
be created under limited agency resources, should an excessive volume
of commission complaints be permitted from applicants and employees
of small businesses. 106 The experiences of the commissions have failed
to disclose any basis for the practical administration argument. Con-
cern over the filing of complaints up to or in excess of agency
capacity has not even been suggested by the commissions. Limited
budgetary allocations for expansion in agency services and a con-
siderable amount of public reticence to resort to commission services
have contributed to the expeditious handling of most complaints. 10 7 It
106. Id. § 127(6), at 28, "practical administration and in order to exempt the
more or less personal relationship of domestic service, small business and family farms
from the scope of the bill...."
107. N.J. DEPT. OF ED., Crv. RTs. Drv., 1960-61 ANN. REP. 8. We may note, how-
ever, that some commissions such as that of New Jersey have from the beginning con-
tinued to handle heavy case loads, owing to the volume and complexity of complaints.
Interesting statistics appear in the Congressional Record for April 8, 1964, at 6987:
"SENATOR CLARK [PA.] Actual experience under State FEPC laws shows that very
few cases result in court actions.
A survey of 12 States, from date of enactment of an FEPC law in each State
through December 31, 1961, shows that in almost 20,000 cases-actually 19,439- there
were only 18 court actions.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a table on that point which appears in
the hearings at page 134 may be printed in full in the RECORD at this point in my
remarks.
There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as
follows:
COMPARATIVE COMPLAINT EXPERIENCE UNDER
STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE LAWS

































iThe Minnesota figures do not cover cases arising in Duluth, Minneapolis, or St.
Paul, where local antidiscrimination laws apply.
2The Missouri law became effective on Oct. 13, 1961. Of the 45 complaints received



















may also be noted that the existence of this type of exemption at
a time when employment opportunities in small businesses are con-
tracting may strengthen the need to eliminate this exemption.
The Temporary Commission specifically excluded domestic workers
in order to exempt the more or less personal relationships of domestic
service. 108 Conceding the intimate and sensitive nature of domestic
service and the racial and religious preferences associated with em-
ployment of those who share the confines of one's home, nevertheless,
the wholesome public purpose of enhancing the general living stand-
ard of these workers necessitates their protection under the statutes.
The exclusion of family employment'0 9 cannot be laid to considera-
tions of enforcement or religious preferences, and inasmuch as such
employment involves small numbers of persons and would not be
based upon race, religion or national origin, its exclusion is entirely
untenable. It is suggested that the rationale behind such a restriction
lies in unreal considerations as to the disruptive effect of investigation
and litigation among members of a family.
Exclusion of agricultural workers" 0 irrespective of numbers em-
ployed, which fails to reflect the intimacy associated with domestic
employment, seems to have gained its impetus from primarily political
considerations. The objections registered with regard to domestic
employees are similarly applicable.
The writer suggests, consistent with the narrowing gap between
professed public policy and special privilege, that the definition of"employer" include any person employing one or more persons;
further, that all employee exemptions be removed.
In order to commit an unlawful employment practice, there must
be an act which is discriminatory on the basis of at least one of the
several grounds expressly provided in the various fair employment
practices statutes. These grounds vary in extent of inclusion and
duplication of terminology, but all jurisdictions include all or a combi-
nation of the following grounds: race, color, creed, religious creed,
national origin, county or ancestral origin, and age."' Several juris-
3The figure given is that of the House committee survey. Testimony of the general
counsel of the New York State Commission for Human Rights suggests that only 4
complaints have resulted in the issuance of cease and desist orders. See statement of
Henry Spitz before Subcommittee on Employment and Manpower, Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, July 29, 1963.
108. See note 86 supra and the authorities cited therein.
109. See note 87 supra and the authorities cited therein.
110. See note 91 supra.
111. New York's statute reads: "because of race, creed, color or national origin .
N.Y. ExEcuTrri LAw § 290. Pennsylvania's statute reads: "because of race, color,
religious creed, ancestry, age or national origin. ... PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 953
(1964). Rhode Island's statute reads: "regardless of their race or color, religion, or
country of ancestral origin . R. " I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-53 (1957).
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dictions have formerly placed a particular interpretation on the mean-
ing of these terms. With respect to "race" and "color," for example,
the New York Commission has construed the term to be synony-
mous112 and statistical compilations of the commissions have reflected
this interpretation by failing to provide for separate racial and color
categories." 3  Thus, discrimination against a Negro is classified as
discrimination because of color, and the term "race" is redundant.
114
National origin and ancestry have also been construed by the same
commission as synonymous.1 5 Fair employment practices statutes pro-
viding for both these grounds would appear to be similarly involved
in the use of redundant terminology.
The more significant term, "creed" has been the subject of more
diligent examination in the major fair employment practices states of
New York and New Jersey, as the word tends to be susceptible to
more varied and expansive meanings. These meanings are said to be
derived from authoritative definitions found in dictionaries and general
literature, in which political as well as religious principles are com-
prehended by the term." 6 An examination of traditional civil rights
legislation and constitutional provisions has concluded this issue in
favor of limiting "creed" to religious views or beliefs.11 Therefore,
while agnostics and atheists are protected from discrimination under
fair employment practices statutes as non-believers whose convictions
are predicated on religious principles," 8 persons of political, economic
and social persuasions are held to have convictions, views or beliefs
which do not constitute a creed within the meaning of the statute." 9
Whether convictions or beliefs are religiously, socially or politically
grounded lacks clearly defined standards. Thus, in one New York
Commission ruling, a conscientious objector who had been so classified
by the Selective Service Board was held to fall under the protection
112. N.Y. SCAD, 1948 lEP. P.noc. 54.
113. N.Y. SCAD, 1959 REP. PRoG. 129 (Table 6).
114. N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP. PRoc. 54.
115. N.Y. SCAD, 1951 REP. PRoc. 31 (Dukson v. Topics Publishing Co.).
116. Assembly Debates, p. 88 (Feb. 23, 1945). See remarks of Irving H. Ives in
the assembly debate preceding the enactment: "unquestionably creed, as it has been
interpreted in all matters dealing with discrimination, means religious beliefs and
nothing else."
117. Op. N.J. Arr'y GEN., No. 17, DAD-AG No. 3 (March 28, 1949). Note this
pertinent comment by the Attorney General: "It would be futile to resort to dictionaries
.. . rather we approach the issue, first, from the viewpoint of the meaning intended
by the legislators and secondly from pertinent provisions of the 1947 Constitution.
118. N.Y. SCAD, 1946 ANN. EPr. 67 (Hartman v. Teachers" College of Columbia
Univ.).
119. R.I. FEPC, 1950 ANN. REP. 3. In statutes such as that of Rhode Island which
specify "religion" rather than "creed," the question is not arguable. In Rhode Island,
clearly it is not unlawful for an employer to make specific inquiries of applicants for
employment regarding membership or affiliation with any Communist, Fascist or other
totalitarian organizations or groups.
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of the statute, as his belief, according to the commission, was based
on religious training.120 On the other hand, this same commission
ruled that moral precepts of the Masonic Order did not constitute a
creed. 12  It would appear, however, that there is no necessary re-
quirement that beliefs be based upon orthodox religious precepts.
Many fair employment practices statutes which prohibit racial,
religious and ancestral discrimination include age discrimination, and
their protective coverage varies between age 25 through 62 or 65, or 40
through 65.'22 Commissions have invoked their jurisdiction with re-
spect to age in accordance with the literal terms of the statutory age
groups, and, as a result, there has been little difficulty in determining
age qualification. Thus, where age limitations barring workers over a
maximum age or between an age group have appeared in advertise-
ments-such as where an employer specifies that he wants a book-
keeper "under 35 years of age" or "between 35 and 45"-commissions
have ruled that, inasmuch as these limitations bar all applicants over
35 or 45 respectively, including those between 40 and 65 who are
within the prohibited age group, they are unlawful.'23 As for age
specifications using descriptive words, a wide area of interpretation
has been explored by commissions. Thus, "wanted young man" or
"young woman" has been ruled unlawful, even though such phrase-
ology in reference to age is indefinite and vague.124 A request di-
rected to experience, but without any age characterization, such as
"15 years experience," is lawful.2 5
The term "person" is the most comprehensive of any jurisdictional
term found in the statutes. It is defined under the New York statute
as including "one or more individuals, partnerships, associations,
corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy,
or receivers." 26 This comprehensiveness is also found either literally
or with slight modification in all the other statutes. Thus a "person"
aggrieved by a violation of these statutes, of a commission's order,
120. N.Y. SCAD, 1946 ANN. Rl'P. 67. (White v. Board of Trans.).
121. Julio Ray v. Webb & Knapp, Inc., C-5866-59. See also N.Y. SCAD, 1960
REP. Paoo. 105.
122. CoNN. Gar. STAT. ANN. § 31-122(K) (1961). HAWn REv. LAws § 90A-1(a)
(Supp. 1963) (no age mentioned); MAss. A x. LAws ch. 151(B), § 1(8) (1951)
(ages 45-65); N.Y. Ex EtrivE LAvW § 296(3)(a) (ages 40-65); ORE. REv. STAT. §
659.024 (1957) (ages 25-65); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(h) (1964) (ages 40-62);
WAs:. REv. CODE § 49.44.090 (1962) (ages 40-65); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)
(b)(1) (1952) (ages 40-65).
123. N.Y. SCAD, 1959 REP. PToc. 71. The New York Commission has ruled that
it has no jurisdiction over complaints filed by persons who claim discrimination becauso
they are under age nor by persons over age 65 (CA-6429-59).
124. N.Y. SCAD, 1959 INVmtP. RuL. 6.
125. Id. at 4.
126. N.Y. ExEcuTIvE LAW § 292(1). This definition is identical to the definition in
the New York State Labor Relations Act. N.Y. LAB. LAw § 701(1).
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or of a court order, shall include every conceivable legal entity, natural
and juridicil.
IV. THE NAT RE OF UNLAwFUL DiscRIMINATORY PRAcrIcEs
All fair employment practices commissions are authorized to deal
with three major avenues of employment discrimination-employers,
employment agencies, and labor unions. New York's statute and
several others prohibit discrimination by employees. 127 New York
and Wisconsin prohibit discrimination in regard to age by employers,
employment agencies and licensing agencies.128 The first, employers,
involves three broad facets-hiring, discharge and discrimination in
compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of employment. Some
statutes contain the phrase "or any matter directly or indirectly related
to employment," seeking thereby to assure the maximization of
commission coverage by express terms, 129 which, in the absence of this
phrase, would be included by statutory implication.
Commissions have laid down-either by case interpretation or by
formal policy statements-rulings which may be considered basic to
the law. No more basic is the interpretation given to the phrase
"because of age, race, creed, color or national origin" in the context
of the provision dealing with unlawful employment practices. 130
Statutory language, legislative history and constitutional requirements
unquestionably show that only prejudicial beliefs and attitudes re-
garding the prohibited grounds, causally related to overt acts, fall
within the enforceable jurisdiction of the statute.131 This was shown
in a recent public accommodation case before the New York Com-
mission.132 A cab driver accepted a negro complainant as a passenger
but refused to take him to his destination, justifiably claiming that such
a trip would delay his scheduled return to the cab terminal. The
passenger indicated to the driver that he would report him to the
police for his refusal, whereupon the driver responded with deroga-
tory racial remarks. The complainant abruptly left the cab. The
Commission, while admonishing the driver for his exceedingly strong
127. N.Y. ExEcur LAW § 297. "Any employer whose employees, or some of them,
refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate . . . may file with the commission a verified
complaint."
128. N.Y. ExEcuTIVE LAw § 295(3); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)(b)(1) (Supp.
1965).
129. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(3) (a) (1960); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4112.02(A);
R.I. Gi. LAws ANN. § 28-5-7(F) (1957).
130. N.Y. TEM'. SCAD REP., Leg. Doe. No. 6, pp. 16, 31, 48-49. "[I]n its proposal
of its principal measure on discrimination, the commission limits direct legal action,
enforceable by penalties, to discrimination in employment."
131. Id. at 16-20, 26.
132. N.Y. SCAD, 1961 RiEP. PRoG. 105. (Simmons v. Londall Operating Corp.).
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prejudice, found that his refusal to provide service to the complainant
was not motivationally connected with the fact that complainant was
a Negro, but rather to the desire not to be off schedule.
The interpretation of the terms "conditions and privileges of em-
ployment" reflects the essential theme of equality typical of fair
employment practices statutes. Commissions, while refraining from
projecting their own job standards on employers,13 3 have insisted
that these standards (job specifications set up as a pre-requisite for
employment) be fixed and applied without discrimination and that a
standard of evaluation in which merit is the sole criterion, be
similarly applied. 34 Other concepts of equality of job opportunity
include non-segregated 135 and non-token employment, equality of
employment opportunities for all persons including members of a
majority racial or religious group who are the objects of discrimina-
tion by members of minority groups and' 36 geographical equality-
that is, the rejection of the principle of quota employment, whereby a
restriction is sought limiting the percentage of persons of a given
religious or racial group to that which those groups bear to the
entire population within a given geographical location.
13
Commissions have categorically rejected the various stereotype argu-
133. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 RaP. Pnoc. 37. (Frazier v. Reader's Digest Ass'n).
134. N.Y. SCAD, REP'. PFoc. 49. "Under normal circumstances, it is not within the
province of the Commission to substitute its judgment for that of an employer, nor will
this ever be done if the exercise of that judgment is made in good faith and not
influenced by considerations declared to be illegal. The test uniformally applied is 'wvas
the complaint judged solely on the merits and without regard to race, creed, color or
national origin'" (Porter v. Gen. Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corn.).
135. KAxm. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002 (Supp. 1961). Kansas' statute defines "un-
lawful employment practices" as including "segregate or separate."
136. N.Y. TFmP. SCAD, 1959 REP. PRoc. 19. This is an example of discrimination
against one member of a minority by another member of a minority. Here a Puerto
Rican was refused employment because he was not a Negro and only Negroes were
employed.
137. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 REP. PNoG. 38. (Moe v. H.R.H. Constr. Corp.); (Saunders
v. Knickerbocker Constr. Corp.). Some respondents have sought unsuccessfully to
counter the severity of this ruling by advancing the reasonable quota argument. The
literal terms of the fair employment practices statute are, however, clear. N.Y. SCAD,
1955 REP. Pnoo. 57-58. We may note that complainants have sought quota commitments.
Thus, in an investigation of a complaint filed before the New York Commission, a
Negro complainant holding Group III status in Local 134, Bottlers and Drivers Union,
urged as part of his request for relief that a minimum figure should be established
as to the number of Negroes to be given Group III status. The investigating com-
missioner stated, "Finally, I think it worthwhile to note for the record that I explicitly
reject complainant's argument . . . that a minimum figure should be established as to
the number of Negroes to be given status in the industry. This Commission has been
consistently opposed to a quota, both as a matter of law and as a matter of policy.
Quota may establish an apparent immediate objective; they almost invariably result in a
long term loss so far as the purposes of the Law Against Discrimination are concerned.




ments frequently advanced by employers. Two types-one for the
benefit of employers, the other allegedly for the benefit of the dis-
criminated party-have been before the New York Commission. With
regard to the former, employers who have had unsatisfactory past
experience with a member of the applicant's racial or religious group,
have concluded that other members of this group will similarly prove
unsatisfactory. Employers also commonly believe that the hiring of a
member of a religious or racial minority would unnecessarily expose
him to the usually encountered discriminatory expressions from other
employees.
The New York Commission has pointed out, first, that every ap-
plicant is entitled to, and guaranteed under the law, consideration for
employment based upon his particular experience and qualifications
only;138 and, secondly, that every employee is guaranteed the right
to perform his duties in accordance with his ability under conditions
which permit him to maintain a sense of self-respect without being
subject to any acts, words or expressions by either employer or fellow
employees which are derogatory of the racial, religious or national
origin group to which he belongs. 39 Further, an employer, when in-
formed of a personality or other conflict between an employee and
supervisor or another employee which is based upon discriminatory
attitudes prejudicing him in his conditions or privileges of employ-
ment, has a positive responsibility to take action to deal effectively
with such a situation. This includes, if necessary, restoration to the
offended employee of the proper conditions and privileges of employ-
ment.
140
138. N.Y. SCAD, 1952 REP. PaoG. 33. (Matter of Julie Jacobs, Inc.).
139. Ibid. In Salston v. Previews, Inc., the Commission, in rejecting this argument,
said, "Members of groups historically discriminated against are aware when they go
into situations where they will meet people of groups other than their own that they
will suffer embarrassment from those who practice un-American and discriminatory
habits of speech. Nevertheless, they must earn their living and, therefore, have tried
to build a support to their sensitivities which would ease such hurt. . . . An employer
must not let his consideration of an applicant be altered because of the possibility that
the position might put applicant in a situation where discriminatory remarks might be
heard."
140. N.Y. SCAD, 1953 RF.P. PRoG. 29. In Sawyer v. Zita, Inc., the Commission said:
"Under the Law Against Discrimination, it is the duty of an employer to prevent
employees from creating a situation which militates against the proper conditions,
privileges and terms of any other employee's employment. This means simply that, if
a group of employees should by their actions and words offend another employee
because of his race, creed, color or national origin, then it becomes the obligation of
the employer, upon being advised thereof, to take immediate action to restore to the
offended employee the proper conditions and privileges of his employment." N.Y. SCAD,
1954 REP. Pnoc. 23. In Phillips v. National Broadcasting Co., the investigating com-
missioner said: "Name calling which might seem innocent under certain circumstances
-in one's family group, where people are aware of close ties-is not permissible in work
situations where it might evidence discrimination .... It is an employer's responsibility
to make certain that those who work for him treat fairly their fellow workers and
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Perhaps no more fundamental an area of protection under the Laws
Against Discrimination exists than that of freedom from religious
discrimination in employment. While conceding that employers may
not, under the clear terms of the statute, discharge employees because
of religious beliefs, affiliations or observances, New York places a
reciprocal responsibility upon employees as well-that is to refrain
from abusing this right under working conditions. Thus, a New York
Commission ruling held that a continuous carrying on of religious
propaganda to the annoyance of an employer's customers, especially
on the situs of employment and during prescribed working hours,
constituted a lawful basis for discharge.141 Further, the same Com-
mission has ruled that, while all persons are free to observe their
religion in accordance with their conscience,'4 employers cannot be
expected to accept the imposition of unusual hardships occasioned by
individualistic practices which deviate widely from those customarily
observed by persons of the same faith.
43
Another basic area of protection has been in regard to private agree-
ments, including collective bargaining and arbitration agreements,
which have the effect directly or indirectly of preventing individuals
from appealing to the law.144 Commissions have had occasion to reject
the validity of an arbitration agreement which had such an effect.
Illustrative is the New York Commission's recent concern over the
so-called Jensen Arbitration award, negotiated between the Interna-
that evaluations be made on fair records, kept without discriminatory factors influencing
the judgment they reflect."
141. N.Y. SCAD, 1951 RP. PRoG. 41. (Sciuto v. Bankers Trust Co.). In this
case it was said by the Commission, "Under the Law, an employee may not be dis-
charged because of his religious belief or afliation, but an employer retains the right
to discontinue the services of an employee if he carries on any propaganda, religious or
otherwise, to the annoyance of his fellow employees, or tenants in a building owned by
the employer, in which employee is working, especially if such acts are committed during
working time."
142. N.Y. SCAD, 1953 REP. lNoG. 27. (Bornstein v. Buying & Research Syndicate,
Inc.). It is never material that the employee does not in fact, religiously observe.
143. N.Y. SCAD, 1955 REP. PRoc. 33. (Feuer v. United Press Ass'n News-
pictures Bureau). N.Y. SCAD, 1960 REP. PnoG. 113. (Turpin v. New York City
Transit Authority). In cases where time off for religious observances is challenged
in New York, the controlling consideration has been whether or not the absence of
the employee would interfere with the orderly and normal operation of the employer's
business. Where to permit time off would not impose a great hardship on both
employer and co-employees, it is unlawful to refuse time off. For a fuller state-
ment, see N.Y. SCAD, 1955 EP. PRoc. 33.
144. Similar protection has arisen under federal legislation. See Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), where the Court held that the Railway
Labor Act imposes on a labor organization the duty to represent all the employees in
the craft without discrimination because of their race; and Hughes Tool Co., 1964
CCH NLRB 13,250, where the NLRB unanimously held that refusal by a local union
to investigate or consider a grievance filed by a Negro employee for reasons of race
amounted to illegal restraint and coercion of the employee in the exercise of his staht-
tory rights under the NLRA.
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tional Longshoremen's Association and New York Shippers' Associa-
tion, which fixed seniority and priorities for employment on the New
York waterfront. The Commission recognized the beneficial effect that
the award had for those Negroes who were presently secured in status
on the waterfront by putting them in a position where they would
likely receive a reasonable degree of employment. But it also declared
that general patterns of negro discrimination, present or future, were
not frozen by the award, and that such an award or any subsequent
agreement could not 'limit, affect, or alter in any manner the right of
an individual to seek redress before this commission for the infringe-
ment or denial of any right granted to such individual by the Law
Against Discrimination."145
Rulings and statutory exemptions affecting job performance in addi-
tion to pension or retirement plans or systems have widened the area
of permissive employer conduct in age discrimination.146
While no employer need hire an applicant who is physically unable
to perform his duties, pre-employment examinations concerning mini-
mum physical standards are required to be reasonably related to job
performance and uniformly applied to all applicants for the particular
job category.47 Further, an employer may also terminate employment
145. N.Y. SCAD, 1959 REP. PFRoG. 30 ("Jenson Agreement"). See also N.Y.
SCAD, 1950 REP. PRoG. 42. (Brandt v. Manny Wolf's Forty-Ninth St. Chop House).
A reprisal against an employee who seeks redress under the Law Against Discrimination
rather than the machinery of arbitration is unlawful in New York. N.Y. SCAD, 1952
REP. PROG. 46. (Eisenstein v. W. R. Grace & Co.). The commission has, by analogy to
"arbitration of grievances" clauses in collective bargaining agreements, concluded that
a money settlement accompanied by a general release constitutes a private agreement
between private parties, which is ineffective to oust the commission of jurisdiction. The
rationale is that any private agreement cannot oust a state agency constituted by the
legislature as an expert body and empowered by it to carry out a particular function
for the public welfare.
146. Statutory exemptions for inability to physically perform only are found in a
number of jurisdictions. See N.Y. ExEcuT=V LAw § 296 3-a(c) (Supp. 1964); ORE. RF-v.
STAT. § 659.026(1) (1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(3)(c) (Supp. 1965). The
intra-agency commissions of Wisconsin and Oregon are singular in their statutory age
exemptions. Wisconsin's statute, apart from the usual provisions granting an exemption
for retirement plans or systems and the inability to perform physically or the need for
education or experience, contains an explicit age exemption where age distinctions
must reasonably be expected to assist in the development of persons for future super-
visory, managerial, professional or executive positions. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(3) (c)
(Supp. 1965). Also, under the same statute, age exemptions apply to hazardous
occupations, including law enforcement and fire fighting. Oregon's statute, while
providing for exemptions for physical inability to perform, and the need for experience
or education, contains no provision for exemptions on the basis of retirement plans or
systems. However, it does contain the unique exemption for public employees. In
addition, certain exempt categories are provided, including state police officers, em-
ployees of the Oregon Liquor Authority, employees of the State Department of Agricul-
ture, sheriffs, police chiefs and policemen, fire chiefs and firemen, and weight masters
employed by the State Highway Department.
147. N.Y. SCAD, REGULATIONS FOR APPLYING AGE DISCRIMUNAnON LAw § F.
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should the person be physically unable to perform his duties, but
such inability is required to be substantial and of a non-temporary
nature. 148 Clearly, the above basis for hire or discharge is not pre-
dicated on age as such.
Some commissions have viewed the inability to perform adequately
because of the physical changes associated with the age of employees
as necessitating a qualified application of the above rule regarding
termination of employment. Thus, in New York, should an employer
establish a policy of terminating the employment of every employee
in a routine job upon his reaching a specified age, predicated on the
belief that employees reaching that age are usually unable to perform
the duties of the job in question, such a policy would be unlawful
unless he can show that his belief has a substantial basis in fact and
that it is not practicable to examine each individual employee's physi-
cal qualifications. 149 New York has enlarged upon this exception.
Where employment is in a highly specialized occupational category,
and demands a high level of physical ability and coordination, it is not
necessary for the employer to show that it is impractical for him to
pass upon the physical merits of each employee. He need only estab-
lish the specialized character of the job category and the "reasonable-
ness" of the compulsory termination. Typical are airline employers
who require the automatic termination of employment of pilots at age
sixty without reference to individual physical conditions.150
Several fair employment practices statutes prohibiting age discrimi-
nation contain explicit provisions exempting the termination of em-
ployment because of age from constituting an unlawful employment
practice when such termination is compulsory under the terms or
conditions of a bona fide retirement or pension plan, or system.151
Connecticut's statute, in addition, has provided an age exemption
when contained in a collective bargaining agreement between an
employer and a bona fide labor organization.
5 2
New York has provided some rulings which illuminate the law
in this area. The New York Commission has ruled that a retirement
age specification which is within the statutory age group shall be
lawful when it is part of a bona fide retirement policy, plan or system
established prior to July 1, 1958, and contains retirement benefits.
1 3
The Commission, in interpreting the bona fides of these systems, plans
148. Id. § G, ex. 2.
149. Id. § G, ex. 3.
150. Id. § G, ex. 4.
151. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-126(1) (Supp. 1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
955(a) (1)(1 9 64 ); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5(c) (Supp. 1965).
152. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 31-126(1) (Supp. 1963).
153. N.Y. SCAD, REGULATIONS FOR APPLYING AcE DISCRIINATION LAW § H(a).
[ VOL.. 18
FAIR EMPLOYMENT COMMISSIONS
or policies, has looked to such elements as effectiveness of communica-
tion to employees, uniformity of application, and substantiality of time
prior to the effective date of the age provision in which compulsory
retirement and payment of benefits have become operative. In cases
where the system, plan or policy was established after June 30, 1958,
the employer will be called upon to demonstrate the reasonableness of
the specified compulsory retirement age in relation to his over-all
employment policy as well as to the particular occupational category
to which it is made applicable.15 4 Where a system, plan or policy
fails to contain employee benefits, then it will be subject to the most
extensive scrutiny of such relevant criteria as the date of the estab-
lishment of the system, plan or policy, the history of its administration,
and the effectiveness of its communication to all employees, in addi-
tion to the requirements under systems, plans or policies containing
benefits but established subsequent to June 30, 1958.155
Commissions have also been confronted with policy decisions which
admit of no easy solution. While it is clearly discriminatory for the
same employer to pay a lesser salary to one racial group of employees
than to another for identical services, would it be unlawful for an
employer to discriminatorily refuse to hire a Negro for one position
while employing him for another with higher pay and prestige? A
technical interpretation would support the view that inasmuch as
discrimination did in fact take place, the statute would be violated
although no economic loss ensued.
Fair employment practices statutes prohibit discrimination in labor
organizations. Discriminatory exclusion or expulsion of individual
applicants, loss of conditions and privileges and unequal treatment
of members are prohibited. In New York, express protection from
discrimination is given by the union to employers and individual
employees.156 Provisions in union constitutions, by-laws, ritualistic
practices, informal rules and the like, which exclude any person from
membership on the grounds prohibited in the statute are unlawful,
and commissions have requested that such documents be revised to
eliminate such provisions. 157 Neither may unions arbitrarily confine
the consideration of any application to a local union of which the
majority of members are of the applicant's race or national origin,
the so-called segregated lodges or auxiliaries. 158
Under the New York statute, it is unlawful: "For an employer or em-
154. Id. § H(b).
155. Id. § H(c).
156. It is unlawful "for a labor organization .. . to discriminate in any way against
any of its members or against any employer or any individual employed by an employer:'
N.Y. EXEcutIVE LAw § 296(1)(b) (Supp. 1964).
157. N.Y. SCAD, 1945 ANN. REP. 56.
158. N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP. PROC. 46.
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ployment agency to print or circulate or cause to be printed or circu-
lated any statement, advertisement or publication.., which expresses,
directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination.
." based upon the prohibited grounds of the statute.1 9 All fair
employment practices statutes except those of Alaska and Illinois
similarly provide that discriminatory publications constitute an un-
lawful employment practice. Wisconsin, as does New York, includes
"licensing agencies" in addition to employers and employment
agencies in age discrimination, but, apart from age discrimination,
Wisconsin provides no protection against unlawful advertisement."'
While Pennsylvania does not prohibit licensing agencies from dis-
criminating as to age, Washington's statute does so provide. Rhode
Island expressly prohibits age discrimination by labor unions, in
addition to employers and employment agencies.161 We may note
that Pennsylvania and Rhode Island have both particularized and
expanded the term "employment agency" by including the phrase "and
other employee referring sources." They sought thereby to avoid any
doubt as to statutory coverage in this area of unlawful practices.
New York and states having similar statutes accomplish the same
result by statutory interpretation.
Most discriminatory advertisements are obvious. Thus, those which
specify "Christian," "Chinese help,' "select Southern help," "Italian
cook," are clearly unlawful. At the other extreme, the insertion of
an ad which reaffirms the law is lawful. Thus such ads as "interested
solely in qualification without regard to race or religion" are clearly
acceptable.162 Other phraseology such as "you are eligible whether
white or colored,"'163 and "Christian-Jewish firm wanted . . ." present
more difficult problems. The New York Commission has found such
phraseology objectionable and has recommended instead the descrip-
tion "Help wanted-non-discriminatory." 64
Discriminatory advertising directed in favor of out of town college
and university applicants against those who are members of minority
group schools in the large metropolitan cities and private educational
institutions has been of particular concern to New York and other
highly industralized Northern and Midwestern states. The New
York Commission has fully examined such specifications as "OOT
COLL," "OOT COLL GRAD" and the like, and has ruled such
159. N.Y. ExEcuryvE LAW § 296 1(c) (Supp. 1964).
160. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32 (Supp. 1965).
161. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-5-7(C) (1957).
162. PA. FEPA, 1958 hnrmap. RuL. 13.
163. The phrase "white or colored" is particularly objectionable as it militates
against the concepts of group homogeniety.
164. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 BEP. PnoG. 40.
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specifications to be unlawful. It has concluded that employers and
employment agencies inserting these ads seek to limit the job oppor-
tunities for young people of Jewish, Negro, Catholic and foreign
extraction who happen to be more numerous in New York City than
elsewhere. Such ads imply, in the view of the commission, that there
is some peculiar defect common to people who attend city colleges
and other schools in New York City. Employers have unsuccessfully
contended that there is no intent to discriminate and have advanced
the argument that such specifications constitute a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification predicated on the principle that, although academic
training is essential, other background such as that acquired from
scholastic association through student living outside the direct orbit
of parental supervision and the broadening contacts made away from
the subway are an asset in any national or international business.165
A version similar to the out of town college specifications is a
New York help wanted advertisement reading "Trainee (3) 20-26,
merchandising career; no Met. N.Y.C. born, relocate; open." Here
too, employers have sought unsuccessfully to show that persons
educated in the metropolitan colleges do not care for the small city
or town life which employment as trainees often entails. They soon
become dissatisfied and ultimately resign, with the resultant loss to
the company of the expense involved in lengthy training programs.
Further, experience has shown that individuals who have been
brought up in New York City and have never lived in rural commu-
nities are less willing to accept outside employment than those who,
even for a short time during their college careers, have lived out af
town. In rejecting these claims, the New York Commission considered
the intended purpose of such specifications and has drawn unfavorable
inferences. It has pointed out that there are a great many individuals
who go to college outside of the city who do not live near the
places where colleges are located, and who might have homes in New
York City.166
"Ivy League" advertisements, although not presenting the same
basis for rejection as the out of town college cases, have been found
objectionable in New York, although at present, the Commission has
not ruled them to be unlawful on their face. Nevertheless, in view of
the questionable character of such advertising, New York has sought
voluntary elimination.
167
A problem not at all solved relates to the use by advertising agencies
of names which in themselves connote both to applicants for employ-
165. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 RE. PRoC. 40. (Matter of Tobison Employment Agency).
166. Ibid. (Matter of Ross Employment Agency).
167. N.Y. SCAD, 1959 REP. PRor. 34.
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ment and to prospective customers that the agency accepts registration
and makes referrals on the basis of the discriminatory grounds of the
statute. Commissions, in the absence of a licensing requirement, have
not sought to require the changes of any existing names, since they
recognize that a name itself may be a valuable asset if the agency
has legitimately established good will under its use. The New York
Commission may now require under an express licensing provision
that, when the use of such an agency name is employed, a parenthe-
tical clause in the advertising copy be added negating the discrimina-
tory implication in the name itself.168
All fair employment practices statutes except that of Alaska specific-
ally prohibit discriminatory pre-employment inquiries. In New York
it is unlawful for any employer or employment agency,
to use any form of application for employment or to make any inquiry in
connection with prospective employment, which expresses, directly or in-
directly, any limitation, specification or discrimination . . . or any intent
to make any such limitation, specification or discrimination, unless based
upon a bona fide occupational qualification.
169
Other statutes include the same provision. 70  Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Michigan, Minnesota, and Rhode Island prohibit discriminatory in-
quiries by labor organizations, as well as by employers and employ-
ment agencies. Connecticut and Illinois, in sharp contrast to the
pattern, limit such provisions to employment agencies only.1
7'
New York and Washington include licensing agencies in the area
of age discrimination. Wisconsin, following the pattern in the area
of unlawful advertisement, includes employers, employment agencies
and licensing agencies, but the provision is applicable to age dis-
crimination only. Oregon, however, provides no protection in the area
of age discrimination.
The intent to discriminate is not an essential of this prohibition.
Consistent with statutory language, commissions have ruled that the
mere giving of a discriminatory application form or the making of a
discriminatory inquiry is sufficient, and the element of good faith is
immaterial.
7 2
168. Newly licensed employment agencies must omit the use of a discriminatory
name, by statute. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 174.
169. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 296(3).
170. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-4-(C) (1953).
171. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-126(b) (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 853(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1964); Micu. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(3)(b) (1960)); MniN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363.03 (1957); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Baldwin 1964); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 955(b) (2) (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 385-7 (1957).
172. N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP. Pnoc. 55. However, in informal proceedings, the New
York Commission considers and gives due weight to the good faith of a respondent,
particularly in determining the nature and extent of any affimative action which may
1002 [ VOL. 18
FAIR EMPLOYMENT COMMISSIONS
The prohibition applies to oral and written inquiries prior to em-
ployment. After an applicant is hired, inquiries made concerning
race, religion, ancestry or age will become, under the statute, the basis
for a compliant under the provision prohibiting discrimination in
the course of employment. 73 It is interesting to note in this regard
that the New York Commission has ruled that it is unlawful to
engage in a discriminatory inquiry in connection with upgrading in
employment. The rationale is that the higher position sought by an
employee constitutes in relation to the position presently held, pros-
pective employment. 7 4
This unlawful employment provision prohibits direct and indirect
discriminatory inquiries. A direct inquiry is a question which on its
face discloses the applicant's race, religion, ancestral background or
age; an indirect one, on the other hand, is a question, the answer to
which will probably disclose the applicant's race, religion, ancestry
or age. 7 5 It is in respect to the latter that important problems are
faced, since indirect questions could be both legitimate and discrimi-
natory in purpose. Commissions must establish limits to which they
will extend inquiries which indirectly express a limitation, specifica-
tion or discrimination. The New York Commission's approach to this
problem has been to consider each inquiry as it has presented itself
and to reach a decision by comparing the inquiry with rulings
previously made. The commission then proceeds to follow the general
test as to whether or not the answer will probably disclose the
applicant's race, religion, national origin or age. In applying the
test of "probability" of disclosure, the commission considers the
factors of materiality and necessity of inquiry to identification, in-
vestigation and evaluation of the applicant. This reflects the principal
objective of the statute not to absolutely preclude disclosure. 7 6
As an illustration of the problem, the New York Commission has
had to pass on union application forms which include questions of
national origin for administrative reasons, or require photographs
to be attached for purposes of preventing fraud. The Commission has
ruled that, although bona fide, such queries may be considered as
evidence of intent to bar applicants from membership, and it is
incumbent upon the unions to revise or otherwise change such
material.
The Commission has sought, in accordance with its general policy,
be required to achieve compliance. N.Y. SCAD, RULINcS ON PRE-EMP1LOYMENT
INQUIIES 1 (January 1, 1961).
173. Id. at 66.
174. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 REP. P]oc. 44. (Backus v. Brooklyn Public Library).
175. RuLgcs ON PRE-EMPLOYNENT INQUnuES, supra note 172, at 6.
176. N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP. PRoc. 56.
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to assist unions in adapting to the law. Thus, where a membership
application form contained the query "English-Italian" in the upper
right corner so as to enable the union to ascertain whether the
prospective member wished to have notices sent to him in English or
Italian, the Commission requested that this question be deleted and
the following inquiry on the reverse side of the form substituted:
"Do you prefer to receive notices of meetings, or other notices,
written in the English or Italian language?"' In those cases where
photographs were requested with membership application forms so as
to check the growing evil whereby members lend cards to friends to
enable them to obtain temporary work, the Commission has requested
that photographs not be affixed to application forms themselves, but
that photographs be submitted independently of the application, and
that the membership committee not see them while they determine the
question of membership178
A general problem which has not been entirely solved is that which
results from the awkward necessity facing some employers to choose
between conflicting orders of different governmental agencies with
respect to particular pre-employment inquiries. Some commissions,
such as New York's, have ruled that whenever an employer can show
that he is following a particular course of action in connection with a
pre-employment inquiry pursuant to a governmental agency having
jurisdiction, the commission will view this agency as the responsible
party and, if action is appropriate, deal with such agency directly.70
Many commissions have used their regulatory power to publish lists
of permitted and prohibited pre-employment inquiries. These com-
missions have taken considerable pain in doing so on the theory
that the most desirable approach with regard to this prohibited
area is merely to admonish. The rulings are designed to be
recurrent reminders of the present state of the law. Some commis-
sions, including New York's, in their interpretation of pre-employment
inquiries, have not only declared particular inquiries to be unlawful,
but in many instances have consulted with employers and employ-
ment agencies as to the purpose of the inquiry and the reason for the
desired information. They have then undertaken to suggest substitute
inquiries which are not unlawful, but which accomplish the same
result.18 0
177. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 REP. PROG. 39. (Raglund v. O'Dowd & Kelvin Eng'r Co.).
178. Id. at 48-49.
179. N.Y. SCAD, 1949 REP. PnoG. 39.
180. Bamberger & Lewin, The Right to Equal Treatment. Administrative Enforce-
ment of Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 74 HAav. L. REv. 526, 559 (1961). Criticism
has been directed toward the excessive compiling of these lists and in discussing
individual injuries or advertisements in the light of the fact that recalcitrant employers
and advertisers may be artful in inventing new phraseology.
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In its published rulings, the Commission has taken the position
that inquiries listed as lawful may be used without question, but if
any inquiry is used which is listed as unlawful, the Commission will
question such usage and request its discontinuance unless there is
factual support that it is not discriminatory in nature, or, if discrimi-
natory, that it is exempted on the basis of a bona fide occupational
qualification. Factual support in the form of new facts relating to a
particular inquiry previously ruled unlawful may result in a modifica-
tion or withdrawal of it.181
Although commissions view the violation of published lists as prima
facie illegal, that is, not necessitating a showing that information
obtained by asking questions which are forbidden has actually been
utilized in the course of hiring a job applicant, they are not deemed
conclusive. The published rulings are made on the basis of findings
which have been made by the commission. They are to be considered
only as presumptions in the preliminary stage of the quasi-judicial
procedure provided by the statute. The statute provides full opportu-
nity, including a public hearing with all elements required to con-
stitute due process, to challenge any ruling. Under the statutory
procedure, therefore, the application of any pre-employment ruling
will ultimately be decided with reference to the facts of the particular
case.1
8 2
Statutory prohibitions against making discriminatory pre-employ-
ment inquiries are subject to one exemption-inquiries based upon
a bona fide occupational qualification upon which a certificate of"qualification" may issue.183 In deciding what constitutes a "qualifica-
tion," commissions are faced with problems that are often as delicate
as they are important. 84 In New York this was early recognized at
the public hearings before the Temporary Commission, where wit-
nesses alluded to this exemption as a possible "loophole' 85 which
employers could use to escape from their statutory obligations.
Charles Tuttle, counsel for the Commission and principal draftsman
of the law, pointed out that the exemption would be granted only on
clear proof of a good faith relationship between the "qualification"
applied for and the nature of the employer's business.186 Subsequently,
the Commission ruled that the "qualification" must be material to
181. N.Y. SCAD, 1951 REP. PRoG. 47-48.
182. N.Y. SCAD, 1953 REP. PRoG. 7.
183. N.Y. ExECuI LAw § 296(1)(c) (Supp. 1964).
184. Supra note 180, at 560.
185. I SCAD, PUtLac HEARIGS 350 (1944); II SCAD, PFuBnc HEARINs 669, 690,
946 (1944).
186. I SCAD, PuBLnc HEAIGs 350 (1944).
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job performance 8 7 This concept of materiality has been given a
broad construction so as to include factors both intrinsic and extrinsic
to work performance.
Whether intrinsic or extrinsic factors will be used to determine
materiality in cases involving racial, religious or ancestral discrimina-
tion has been an issue of particular controversy. This controversy
arises because decisions based on extrinsic factors involve a policy
determination. Thus, in New York, neither traditional practices, the
preferences of customers, employers and employees to deal or work
with persons of a particular race, creed or national origin, would justify
the issuance of a "qualification" based thereon.'88 These qualifications
bear no relation to factors intrinsic to work performance-the standard
of materiality applied in these cases.189 For policy reasons, however,
the Minnesota Commission has held otherwise. It has ruled that an
employer has a right to create various types of atmosphere and
determine the style of decor in their places of business so long as
they do not use this as an intentional device for excluding persons of
different racial or religious backgrounds.'90
Where the issue is not whether intrinsic factors should be applied,
but whether there is a sufficient correlation between the "intrinsic"
qualification sought and the requirements of work performance, the
issue becomes merely one of fact. Thus, the New York Commission
has allowed a religious "qualification" for the employment of non-
Jews in an Orthodox Jewish hotel because under the Jewish Orthodox
faith Jews are not permitted to work as bell-hops on the Sabbath.10 '
Also, under Jewish Orthodox law, the maker of Kosher wine is required
both to offer prayer at its pouring and to be orthodox in its handling.192
Cases in which the correlation between the "qualification" and job
performance has been remote, necessitating a denial of "qualification,"
similarly involve a factual determination. Thus, the New York Com-
mission has denied "qualification" both on the remoteness of the
187. N.Y. SCAD, 1946 REP. PRoc. 18; N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP. Pntoc. 61; N.Y.
SCAD, 1952 REP. PRoG. 36.
188. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 REP. PRo. 47.
189. N.Y. SCAD, RuaNcs oN PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUmiEs 7 (January 1, 1961).
190. MiNN. FEPC, 1958 ANx. REP. 6; N.Y. SCAD, 1955 lEP. Pnoc. 36. But sea
Hinds v. Walter Lindecke. There the New York commission found that the com-
-plainant was refused admission to the respondents establishment because of his color,
but that the motivation thereof was a fear of resentment on the part of %vhite patrons,
with a consequent loss of business. In this connection, the respondent was advised
that even in the remote contingency that the admission of Negroes constituted a
business risk, it was a risk the respondent had to assume.
191. N.Y. SCAD, 1960 REP. PRoC. 118. (Leo Gartenberg and Jacob Schechter).
192. N.Y. SCAD, 1960 REP. PROC. 119. (Caneles-Lenger Wine Corp.).
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correlation between racial background and public opinion on the
subject of liquor preferences or the ability to function successfully as
a social worker.
93
New York for over a decade has been plagued with the question
of whether employers or their agents should be allowed to elicit
information concerning an applicant's religion and his preferences of
a foreign country for work location, when the furnishing of such
information is purported to serve the interests of American inter-
national relations. In American Jewish Congress v. Carter,94 the
New York Court of Appeals held that an employer or agent is not
entitled to a "qualification" based upon religion invoked by a foreign
government. A brief review of the background of the commission's
activities leading up to this case will prove instructive.
In 1947, the New York Commission granted a "qualification" to the
J. Walter Thompson Company. The company had requested the
qualification in connection with an advertisement which it sought
to place in a New York newspaper on behalf of a New Zealand com-
pany seeking to recruit engineers and technicians for employment in
New Zealand. Its job offer was restricted to British subjects. The
Commission's grant of "qualification" went unchallenged.195 In 1950,
a complainant, Daytree, filed a complaint against the International
Placement Agency and the American Arabian Oil Company, its prin-
cipal, charging that the placement agency had been directed by the
American Arabian Oil Company to ascertain applicants for employ-
ment in Saudi Arabia who were of the Jewish faith. Saudi Arabian
policy was to refuse entrance visas to Jews. The Commission granted
the respondents a "qualification" based on information from State
Department officials that the exigencies of American foreign policy
required that Saudi Arabia'spreference be honored. The Commission,
however, limited its grant to employment within the Arabian states.19
We may note that the New Jersey Commission had previously granted
a "qualification" in a related case. 197 Some two years later, a com-
plaint was filed against American Arabian Oil Company charging
color discrimination. In the course of the ensuing investigation, the
193. N.Y. SCAD, 1960 REP. PROC. 116-17. (Ingram v. Benton & Bowles, Inc.).
194. 9 N.Y.2d 223, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961).
195. N.Y. SCAD, 1959 REP. PRoc. 82. No specific determination has as yet been
made in the area of national origin, citizenship and age. See the J. Walter Thompson Co.
case and the Aruba case. Place of birth and age requested by the Aruba government
of all expatriate personnel to be employed in Aruba, Netherlands Antilles-granted
by Commission Nov. 6, 1958.
196. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 REP. PROC. 47-48. (Daytree v. American Arabian Oil Co.);
(Daytree v. International Placement Agency).




Commission had occasion to admonish the company against a policy
of religious discrimination. 198
In 1956, the American-Jewish Congress filed a complaint charging
the American Arabian Oil Company on two counts-first, with re-
fusing to hire persons of the Jewish faith, and second, directly ques-
tioning and attempting to solicit information on application forms as
to whether applicants were Jews. The Congress sought to amul the
determination as to the grant of the "qualification" and to have its
charges credited. The investigating commissioner, adhering to the
rationale and similar findings of fact of the 1950 determination, found
for the respondent company. Upon appeal to the supreme court, the
commission determination was reversed. Judge Epstein held that,
as a matter of law, a bona fide occupational qualification did not apply
where it failed to be intrinsic to job performance. In the case at band,
religious affiliation bore no intrinsic relation to the ability to engage
in technical labor. He further held that extrinsic factors were not
present for the qualification. Under established principles of constitu-
tional law, in the absence of a conflicting treaty or federal statute, the
public policy of New York State, as evidenced by the Law Against
Discrimination, prevails over what may be deemed the economic and
political interests of the United States. In addition, he held that the
commission findings of the respondent company's lack of discrimina-
tion in domestic employment lacked a factual basis and was, therefore,
arbitrary and capriciously determined. 199
An important area where extrinsic factors have been deemed
material in granting a qualification involving discrimination in na-
tional origin has been in connection with contracts affecting the na-
tional security. The New York Commission has ruled that where a
federal agency, under appropriate regulations, requires an employer
under contract with it to obtain specified information such as place
of birth and citizenship, the required inquiries will be deemed to be
based upon a "qualification." The Commission ordinarily suggests to
the employer that he make an application to the Commission for a
ruling that the inquiries required by the federal agency are based
on a qualification. The Commission communicates with the agency
confirming the necessity for such inquiry. Needless to say, in this area,
198. Shede v. American Arabian Oil Co., C-8717-52. Brief of Appellant, p. 10,
American-Jewish Congress v. Carter, supra note 194.
199. American Jewish Congress v. American Arabian Oil Co., 23 Misc. 2d 446, 190
N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959), modified, 10 App. Div. 2d 833, 199 N.Y.S.2d 157
(1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 233, 173 N.E.2d 778 (1961). The case was unanimously af-
firmed by Appellate Division with the modification that the provision remitting the
matter to the commission to be disposed of "in accordance with the memorandum
opinion filed simultaneously" be struck. This modification was upheld and the appellate
division was affirmed by the court of appeals.
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the Commission, recognizing the importance of expeditious action,
makes every effort to give prompt attention to such requests.
200
Where the qualification sought has involved age rather than race,
religion, creed, color or national origin, extrinsic factors more easily
lend themselves to the materiality necessary for the "qualification."201
Yet, even here, the terminology employed has often been less than
totally precise. The New York regulations, for instance, permit con-
sideration of age as a qualification when it is a bona fide factor "in
connection with job performance," 20 2 or "in an apprentice training or
on-the-job training program of long duration,"2 3 or "in fulfilling the
provisions of other statutes."2°
In addition to the New York rulings approving these qualifications,
Pennsylvania and Connecticut have included in their statutes the
right to predicate a "qualification" on the extrinsic age factor by
providing that the unlawful employment practices sections are in-
applicable to the terms and conditions of bona fide retirement, pension
or employee group insurance plans.05 New York's and Wisconsin's
statutes refer to retirement policies or systems. 2 1 Connecticut's
statute expressly includes bona fide apprenticeship plans or systems.
20 7
Inasmuch as pre-employment inquiry as to age on an application form
is unlawful when made for the purpose of barring any individual
200. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 ANN. REP. 64-66. Note that the California statute specifically
provides for exemptions for security reasons: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice, unless based upon . . . applicable security regulations established by the
United States or the State of California." CAL. LABOR CODE § 1420. The employer in
California, in seeking a qualification, must await a commission ruling; any earlier act,
if in violation of the statute, will be held illegal, even if an exemption is subsequently
granted.
201. There are generally more requests for determining bona fide qualifications for
age than in any other area.
202. N.Y. SCAD, REGULATIONS FOR APPLYING AGE DISCRImIATION LAW §
D (1) (a). Jobs in airlines as pilots and stewardesses have been one of the first occupa-
tional areas in which exemptions were available. PA. FEPC, 1960 ANN. REP. 6.
Pennsylvania allowed bona fide occupational qualifications because the rigorous train-
ing given stewardesses obviously could not be undertaken by women of age 40 or
more. Statutes have also provided expressly for exemptions on the basis of physical
ability to perform.
203. N.Y. SCAD, REGULATONS FOR APPLYiNr AGE DiCRIMINATION LAw § D(1) (b).
204. Id. § D(1)(c).
205. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a)(1)-(3) (1964). See also CONN. GEN. STAT.
REv. § 31-126 (1961), which provides "(2) operation of the terms or conditions of
any bona fide retirement or pension plan, (3) operation of the terms or conditions of
any bona fide group or employee insurance plan ......
206. "[O]r to affect the retirement policy or system of any employer where such
policy or system is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purpose of this subdivision."
N.Y. ExEcuT LAw § 396-3-a(c). "[N]or to affect any retirement policy or system of
any employer where such policy or system is not a subterfuge to evade the purpose of
this subsection." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(5)(c) (Supp. 1965).
207. "(4) operation of any bona fide apprenticeship system or plan." CONN. GEN.
STAT. RE .§ 31-126 (1961).
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or otherwise discriminating against him in employment, the presence
of maximum entrance age requirements necessitated by the terms of
retirement or apprenticeship plans or systems must stand or fall on
the validity of those plans or systems within the intended meaning
of these exempt provisions. New York regulations with respect to
the lawfulness of these plans or systems are instructive. Under those
regulations, the existence of a provision in a retirement plan stating
a maximum eligibility age for entrance into the plan is not a lawful
basis for refusing an applicant for employment who is over the
stated age, if the compulsory retirement age provision set forth in
the plan could be made applicable to the employee without resulting
in its disqualification under the Internal Revenue Code.20 8 An em-
ployer, however, may advise an applicant that if he is over the
maximum entrance age of a bona fide retirement plan, he will be
accepted for employment, but that under the terms of the plan he
may either be excluded or receive reduced benefits.209 Costs of the
retirement plan or system after a maximum age may be the basis for
refusal in employment. In New York, the employer must demonstrate
that the increased costs will be substantial enough to materially affect
the terms or conditions of the plan. Such cases are examined and
reviewed to determine any changes in circumstances.210 Employers
may vary insurance coverages (apparently under group policies)
according to age.
21'
Commissions grant bona fide occupational qualifications upon the
facts presented in each specific case, and refrain from general defi-
nitions. Thus, a request by a detective agency to have the New
York Commission grant a blanket bona fide occupational qualification
to all detective agencies in the state, authorizing them to honor
discriminatory specifications of race or color as to investigators and
guards, was denied. However, commissions will afford an employer in
this regard the opportunity, by previous submission or upon investi-
gation itself, to present reasons why an exemption should be made
in the case of a particular agency based upon its own factual back-
ground and experience.
212
In New York, typical of fair employment practices jurisdictions,
the burden of proof as to the validity of a qualification is upon the
employer, inasmuch as a bona fide occupational qualification is an
208. N.Y. SCAD, REGULATIONS For APPLYING AGE DISCRIMINATION LANW § I, ex. 1.
209. Id. § I, ex. 2.
210. Id. § J.
211. Id. § K.




exception to the general statutory prohibition.213 In jurisdictions such
as Pennsylvania, the ruling is reversed. There the commission has
the burden of showing that the qualification when challenged is
non-essential.
14
It may be noted that New York does have two significant procedural
distinctions with regard to the "qualification." First, contrary to
prevailing commission practice, under its rules of procedure, the
question of determining a qualification rests upon the non-reviewable
discretion of its assigned investigating commissioner. He may request,
however, the advice of the full commission prior to his determina-
tion.215 Second, employment agencies have been privileged. As
a general rule, an employment agency filling a job order containing
an age specification will share responsibility with the employer unless
a determination of "qualification" is made. In New York, the agency
will not be held to have violated the law if the agency acted in good
faith in seeking to comply with the law and, in addition, maintained
written records available to the commission in regard to each job
order which it seeks to fill upon the basis of a "qualification." Such
records are required to include the names of the employers, job
descriptions, and the basis for the claim of "qualification." 6
The New York statute provides that it is an unlawful employment
practice for,
any employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel,
or otherwise discriminate against any person because he has opposed the
practices forbidden by this article (Law Against Discrimination) or because
he has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this
article.
217
All fair employment practices statutes have a comparable provision.
Ohio, however, maximizes coverage by using the term "person" in
lieu of "employer, labor organization or employment agency."218 The
"opposed to any practices" provision is primarily designed to free
aggrieved persons from fear of reprisal for seeking recourse to the
remedies afforded by the statute as complainants, and to encourage
candor on the part of those participating as witnesses at pre-public
and public hearings. 219 Relatively few cases of this nature have
213. Bamberger & Lewin, supra note 180, at 561.
214. Ibid.
215. N.Y. SCAD, R. Pac. & PRoc. 227.
216. N.Y. SCAD, REGuLATioNs FOR APPLYING AGE DIcRIMNATIoN LAw § E.
217. N.Y. ExEcuTrVE LA-w § 296(1)(d).
218. Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(G) (Baldwin 1964). "[Flor any person to
discriminate in any manner ... against any other person."
219. N.Y. SCAD, 1954 la'. PROG. 30. We may note there is no implied intent to




been presented to the commissions, however, and rulings are sparse.
One New York case is interesting. Complainant was allegedly dis-
charged because he filed a previous complaint against a respondent
employer. The filing had the effect of apprising the employer of the
complainant's unsatisfactory work performance, the prime factor lead-
ing to the discharge. The commission ruled that, although the filing
was only indirectly responsible for the employee's discharge, it
was one of the contributing causal factors in his discharge, and hence
unlawful.22
The New York statute provides that it is unlawful "for any person
to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of [any] act ...
[prohibited by the] Statute, or to attempt to do so."221 Almost all fair
employment practices statutes contain a comparable "aiding and
abetting" provision.22 Some are more restrictive than the New York
provision. Few cases in this category have confronted commissions,
and few of these have justified findings of discriminatory intent.223
More frequently, cases arise where this intent is absent, such as where
employment agencies fail to refer prospective applicants to employers
they suspect of discriminatory practices, wishing to spare them em-
barrassment, or where referrals are limited by these agencies on the
assumption that the applicant would not be interested in applying for
such positions. These cases have been held to constitute unlawful
employment practices under the "aiding and abetting" provision.
The Commission has ruled that agencies are required to advise the
applicant of the names and addresses of such employers, leaving to
them the decision as to whether the applicants are acceptable.224 The
New York Commission has gone further and ruled that merely in-
quiring as to employer's preference in terms of race, creed, color or
national origin constitutes an unlawful act.22
220. N.Y. SCAD, 1949 REP. PRoG. 30-31. (Saunders v. Harbor Marine Constr.
Corp.).
221. N.Y. EXECuTnVE LAw § 296(6).
222. ORE. REv. STAT. § 659.030(5) (1963). Oregon's statute appears most restrictive
by stating "for any person, whether an employer or an employee. ... The statutes
of Pennsylvania and other states, however, use the phrase "For any person, whether
or not an employer, employment agency, labor organization or employee, to aid, abet,
incite, compel or coerce the doing of an act declared by this action to be an unlawful
discriminatory practice." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(e) (1964). N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-4-4(E), contains the phrase "whether an employer or an employee or not . . ."
223. Typical of hostile cases is a situation where a lessee is ordered by a landlord
to discharge an employee under threat of invoking a cancellation provision of the lease,
should the lessee resist his demands. See, e.g., N.Y. SCAD, 1959 REP. Pitoo. 92-93.
(Morehead v. World-Wide Transp. Desk, Inc.).
224. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 REP. PROG. 43. (Matter of Nostrand Employment Agency).





An action against a party alleged to have committed a discrimina-
tory act must normally begin with the filing of a complaint. All fair
employment practices statutes, other than that of Minnesota, expressly
provide that the complaint must be verified; Minnesota simply re-
quires that it be signed by the complainant or his authorized agent.26
The general rules of evidence are applicable to the verification of
complaints. Thus, the New York Commission on Human Rights has
ruled that a minor may file a verified complaint providing he under-
stands the meaning of an oath. 2 7 Unverified statements by telephone
or hearsay are uniformly rejected as a basis for a verified complaint
under commission rule-making policies.
228
All statutes permit a complaint to be brought by an "aggrieved
person." Many, in addition, permit an attorney-at-law of any person
claiming to be aggrieved to file; some provide that a state official,
either the Attorney General or Labor Commissioner, may file on behalf
of the people of the state.229 Some states have permitted employers as"aggrieved persons" to file against employees who refuse to comply
with the law.210
"Aggrieved person" includes all those persons who have been al-
legedly denied equal treatment. Does it include persons who have
been the object of discrimination without having suffered an economic
loss? Some commissions have held that it does. Thus, an employment
agency with whom a discriminatory order is placed by an employer
or placement interviewer is an "aggrieved person." 1
226. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.06 (Supp. 1963).
227. N.Y. SCAD, 1951 REP. PnoG. 58 (Matter of Storer).
228. Id. at 33. (Bowman v. White Plains Greeting Card Corp.). As to unverified
complaints in commission-instituted investigations, the New York Commission has ruled
that such an investigation must be based upon credible information from responsible
sources, accompanied by a reasonable amount of factual data. The Commission will
not initiate an investigation based solely on hearsay, rumors, or gossip. We may note,
however, that anonymous communications such as letters protesting discriminatory
hiring practices of employers against whom a verified complaint is pending are in-
formatively held by the New York Commission. The commission bears .in mind,
however, their anonymous character.
229. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1005 (Supp. 1961) (the Attorney General). N.M.
STAT. ANt. § 59-4-10(b) (1953) (the Attorney General or Industrial Commissioner).
N.Y. ExE unvE LAw § 297(1) (the Attorney General or the Industrial Commissioner).
N.J. STAT, ANN. § 18:25-13 (1964) (the Attorney General or Commissioner of Labor).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964) (the Attorney General).
230. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 lREP. FROG. 52. (Jaydean Restaurant v. Engel).
231. N.Y. SCAD, 1951 REP'. PRoG. 14; N.Y. SCAD, 1949 Ran'. PRoG. 31-32. The
New York Commission has ruled in the cases of Quality Pearl Co. and Jones v. Tailored
Woman, Inc., that an employment agency "is a person chiming to be aggrieved." Note,
however, a placement interviewer, if held to be an independent contractor, can not




The statutes of Ohio and Rhode Island specifically permit interested
private agencies to file complaints.232 In New York, lacking such
express authority, group filing is restricted by statutory construction
to pre-employment inquiries and unlawful employment advertising.213
In any event, policy favors this restriction because it is primarily in
these types of cases that groups rather than individuals are aggrieved.
The practical question of whether a business or a trade organization
can file a complaint against a competitor whose discriminatory prac-
tices may unduly affect its business operations under the theory of
protecting group interests has not been presented before any com-
mission regulating employment. The New York Commission, however,
has had the opportunity to pass upon this question in regard to
individual proprietors catering to the public who have sought
relief because of incidental or indirect harm caused by a discriminating
competitor. A New York City complainant, a barber, charged a
competing barber with referring all his negro customers to him. Ie
alleged the loss of white trade as a result. The New York Commission
ruled that the complainant was not a "person aggrieved," inasmuch as
he was not denied, nor had he even sought, service.2 4 A similar case
was investigated by the Colorado Commission. There a proprietor of
a dance hall alleged loss of patronage owing to its practice of ad-
mitting patrons regardless of group identity, whereas a competing
dance hall refused admittance to persons of Spanish ancestry.2 35
Test cases have been presented before some commissions. Individ-
uals, prompted by some group interest or motivated by a sense of
justice, who apply for a job, knowing that they probably will be
refused, and having no intention of accepting a position if offered,
have been held to be "aggrieved persons."236  Some commissions,
232. Onio REV. CoDE ANN. §§ 4112.05(B), 4112.01(A) (Baldwin 1964), provides,
"Whenever it is charged in writing and under oath by a person, referred to as the
complainant." "Person includes.., and other organized groups of persons." R.I. Gru.
LAws ANN. § 28-5-17 (1956), provides "or an organization chartered for the purpose
of combating discrimination or racism, or of safeguarding civil liberties, or of promoting
full, free, or equal employment opportunities .... ." See also R.I. Comm. AGAINST
DIscRIMINATION, PorLIciEs OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRAcTIcEs 3 (1949). The express
provisions permit private agencies to file in the many categories of employment dis-
crimination.
233. N.Y. SCAD, 1956 REP. Pnoc. 27-29 (American Jewish Congress v. Hill); id. at
37-38 (Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith v. American Veterinary Publications, Inc.)
(semble). See also MAss. CoMm. AGAINST DISCRIINATION, PoIcmIs 3 (1958). In
Massachusetts, pre-employment inquiries are subject to attack only when employment
has been refused in answer to them.
234. N.Y. SCAD, 1959 ANN. REP. 94 (Barcia v. Armenio).
235. CoLo. ANTI-DiscRnhINATON COMM'N, 4TH ANNUAL REmoaT 10 (1957-58).
The Commission failed to find probable cause. No ruling on the issue of whether the
complainant was an "aggrieved person" was made.
236. Note, 74 HAsv. L. REv. 526, 531 (1961). In an interesting housing complaint
before the New York Commission, a Negro alleged that his efforts to apply for a house
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however, such as Oregon's, have discouraged what they call "entrap-
ment cases" although they have accepted such complaints.
237 Of
course, those who apply for employment expecting to be refused but
willing and able to accept such employment, if offered, are clearly
"aggrieved."
Some commission rules provide for prepared forms upon which
complaints or charges are to be written238 Others have no fixed
forms for privately-initiated complaints. Prepared forms may serve
to increase uniformity and to encourage factual detail, and, thus, are
thought to be desirable.
The categories of information of a complaint are outlined in many
of the rules of procedure, all of which require at least three elements:
the full name and address of respondents, a concise statement of
facts constituting the alleged unlawful practices, and the date or dates
of the alleged unlawful act or acts.239 While all statutes grant to
an "aggrieved person" the absolute right to file a complaint and have
it processed, the purpose of an interview is to help screen out those
complaints, which are frivolous or manifestly not within the juris-
diction of the commission, and to permit the redrafting of complaints
which are often in non-legal and ambiguous language. This procedure
is intended to anticipate counteraction by the respondent, who may
claim that the complaint's charge of discrimination is insufficient
owing to its sparsity, vagueness, indebtedness, or speculative nature-
defects which he may raise subsequently at a public hearing or in
court on a motion to dismiss.2n
in a project were frustrated by various excuses given by an agent. The respondents con-
tended that complainant was not seriously interested in the project but wanted to make
a "test case." A determination of probable cause was found and the terms of conciliation
provided for commission supervision "in the event that complainant for any reason
declines to accept a house as offered by respondent...." Tapley v. Biljean Realty
Corp., CH-5620-58. See also N.Y. SCAD, 1959 REP. PROG. 91-92.
237. Note, supra note 236, at 529.
238. N.Y. SCAD, R. PR~c. & Ploc. § 2(h) (1953). See also N.Y. SCAD, 1948
REP. PNoG. 14. Forms are available in New York. In Rhode Island, the commission
form is optional. See B. of Prac. & Proc. Art. I, "Complaint," (July 27, 1949).
Similarly, Rules & Regulations of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and the Massa-
chusetts Commission Rules of Procedure provide for prepared forms for commission-
initiated actions. OHio CrvIL RiGHTs Conx'N, R. & REG. 11(9) (Aug. 31, 1960); MASs.
Comexvl'N, Ruris or PRoc. 1(b) (Jan. 6, 1961).
239. E.g., N.Y. SCAD, R. PRAc. & Thoc. § 2C (1953). Omo CrWL PGHTS Coev,
R. & Rmn. 4-5 (1960).
240. Typical is Pennsylvania--"Whenever practical, complainants will be asked to
write out their complaints in their own words, with whatever assistance is needed from
the interviewer to insure full details." PA. FEPC, INVESTIGATIoN PRocEUREs § IA.
However, Oregon insures that a complaint will be more accurate and detailed by first
requiring that an investigation based upon the story of the aggrieved be made. Upon
a finding of probable cause, a new petition is filed by the Administrator. ORE. BupxAu
or LABoB, CrvL RIGHTS Div., RuLEs or Anir. Poc. 5 (1) (1959).
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The redrafting of a complaint by commission attorneys, however,
does not eliminate the problems associated with stating a cause of
action. As was said by the New York Court of Appeals in Holland v.
Edwards,24
One intent on violating the Law Against Discrimination cannot be expected
to declare or announce his purpose. Far more likely is it that he will pursue
his discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by methods subtle
and elusive-for we deal with an area in which subtleties of conduct ... play
no small part.2
4 2
Recognizing this, the court rejected the alleged violator's contention
that the inherent vagueness or subjectiveness of allegations justified
a dismissal as a matter of law.
No other judicial determination on this precise point has been
found. On the commission level, the case of Cohen v. River Rouge
Savings Bank243 is typical. There, the Michigan Commission addressed
itself to the question of the propriety of including the complainant's
subjective or speculative convictions of discrimination in a complaint.
The Commission, recognizing the evidentiary difficulties inherent in
discrimination cases, made this observation in response to a motion for
dismissal on the grounds that the complaint contained, among other
defects, speculative allegations.
As to complainant's subjective belief of discrimination, people do not gen-
erally broadcast discriminatory acts but attempt to bide them under vague
generalities so that most often discrimination can be felt only as a subjective
belief, and it is this specific type of conduct the Fair Employment Practices
Act was promulgated to eliminate.
It may be noted that frequently through investigatory or conciliation
meetings, quite apart from the complaint itself, the respondent is
completely apprised of the facts and could not in good faith plead
ignorance.
Some commissions, including that of New York, require a statement
as to other actions, civil or criminal, instituted in any other forum,
based on the same unlawful discriminatory act alleged in the com-
plaint.245 To allow the "aggrieved person" first to seek a court remedy
and thereafter commence proceedings before the commission if not
satisfied with the court's determination would encourage a multiplicity
of suits, the attending disadvantages of which are considered deroga-
241. 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954).
242. Id. at 45, 119 N.E.2d at 584.
243. Claim No. 1050 (Mich. FEPC 1961).
244. Ibid.
245. N.Y. SCAD, R. PRAc. & PRoc. 2(c) (5) (1953).
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tive of successful administration. 246 Conversely, to permit a complain-
ant to commence a court action while proceedings are pending before
the commission is deemed equally derogative of sound administration;
thus, the commissions of New York, Pennsylvania, and other states
preclude any other action or remedy on the same cause while the
action is pending before the commission.247 The complainant, however,
has the opportunity of initiating an action for damages under the
traditional civil rights statutes in a case pending before the New York
Commission, provided the Commission should in its discretion permit
withdrawal.248 Further, in New York and other states, once an
"aggrieved person" has resorted to the remedy provided by the Law
Against Discrimination, and a final determination by the commission
has been made, it is deemed exclusive.219
All commission rules provide that a complaint may be amended
by the commission or complainant. Statutes vary in permitting amend-
ment prior to hearing or issuance of notice of a hearing. Complainant
may amend in New York250 and in Massachusetts, 25 1 as of right prior
to issuance of the notice of hearing. Thereafter, in New York com-
plainant may amend at the discretion of the hearing commissioners,
246. The New York Commission has ruled, however, that in this area it will accept
complaints previously brought before the court if such complaints were dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, on the theoretical grounds that the cause was never actually before
the forum.
247. N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 300. "The procedure, herein, while pending ... exclu-
sive." Also in Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury, 208 Misc. 35, 144 N.Y.S.2d
747 (Sup. Ct. 1955), the court said: "We are, therefore, constrained to hold that
whether the instant proceedings [before the commission] are to be deemed concluded
or still pending when the complainant commenced her action in the Municipal Court
[action to recover $500 for violation of sections 40-41 of the Civil Rights Law] presents
no vital issue. In either situation, the commission would have sole jurisdiction and
could not be ousted therefrom by the subsequent institution of the plenary action."
Id. at 40, 144 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
The New York law further provides that "if such individual institutes any action
based on such grievance without resorting to the procedure provided in the law, he
may not subsequently resort to the procedure therein." This provision has been inter-
preted in the case of Rivera v. Seafarers' Int'l Union of North America, N.Y. SCAD,
1957 REP. PRos. 68-70. If the following situations are not present, the proVision is not
applicable: (1) The prior action is not an action under the Civil Rights Law or any
law of the State relating to discrimination because of race, creed, color or national
origin. (2) The complainant in the prior action did not proceed on the theory that the
respondent had committed a wrong because of race, creed, color or national origin.
(3) The decision of the court did not demonstrate that it considered and decided
any issue of discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin.
248. N.Y. SCAD, R. PRAc. & PROC. 2(j) (1953).
249. N.Y. ExEcuTrvE LAw § 300: "And the final determination therein shall exclude
any action, civil or criminal, based upon the same grievance of the individual concerned."
250. N.Y. SCAD, R. PRAc. & PROC. 2(i) (1953). The amendment power was
exercised in a New York case where twenty-one separate complaints were consolidated
and amended. One charge of discrimination was deleted. Carey v. Hall, N.Y. SCAD,
1951 REP. PROG. 56.
251. MAss. COMM'N AGAINST DISCRImNATION, R. PRAC. & PROG. 7 (1961).
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while in Massachusetts, only the commissioners may amend.
In New York, adding a cause of action not enumerated in the
original complaint prior to issuance of notice of a public hearing
requires the exercise of commission discretion under proper circum-
stances.5 A complainant, however, may as a matter of right amend
his complaint prior to hearing by adding a party complainant or
respondent.213
Provisions granting the right to withdraw range widely from a
right to do so at any stage of the proceedings to that of requiring
the consent of the commission. Thus, in some jurisdictions, a com-
plaint, or any part of it, may be withdrawn by the complainant at
any time.2 In other jurisdictions, withdrawal is permitted prior to
the issuance of a commission complaint or final disposition by concilia-
tion;2 5 still others are more restrictive, requiring that a withdrawal
must be by consent of one or more investigating commissioners prior
to notice of a public hearing, and thereafter, only by consent of the
commissioners at the public hearing.256  A few statutes permit a
complaint to be withdrawn only by the commission in its discretion
and under specified conditions.257 The importance of requiring the
consent of the investigating commissioner is obvious. Otherwise, the
complainant would be subject to pressures from employers or unions,
seeking to persuade him to discontinue proceedings, particularly when
the hearing stage has been reached. To prevent a complainant from
stifling commission action and to permit just causes to come to a
satisfactory conclusion, most states require commission consent.2 8
252. Also, the New York Commission, upon an investigation of facts, may amend the
complaint to conform to the facts adduced thereto, namely the status of respondent.
N.Y. SCAD, 1950 REP. PRoG. 44 (Richardson v. Rae). The New York Commission
has ruled that the statutory provision authorizing amendment of complaints vests the
investigating commissioners with the discretion, under proper circumstances, to add a
new cause of action not enumerated in the original complaint. N.Y. SCAD, 1958 ANN.
REP. 60.
253. N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP. PROG. 48-49 (amended by adding party respondent).
SCAD, 1959 REP. PROG. 77 (amended by adding party complainant).
254. E.g., Pa. Human Rights Comm'n, REGULATIONS 101.09 (1961).
255. Omo Crvr RIGHrs Coner'N, R. & REG. II(b) (1962).
256. E.g., MASS. Cownv'N AGAINST DscnIIu NATIoN, R. PFAc. & Pitoc. (f) (1961).
In New York, the consent of two commissioners is required. N.Y. SCAD, R. PnAc. &
PIoc. (j) (1961).
257. E.g., CAIFw. FEPC, R. & REG. 19002(f) (1961), 1. If the request is made
before the application has been filed, 2. If after, consent of commission.
258. In a complaint charging respondent with discrimination due to color in the
terms of employment, the complainant requested that her complaint be withdrawn
because the employer promised equal treatment "in the future." The New York Com-
mission found the charges with regard to the refusal to upgrade Negroes too important
to dismiss and denied the request to withdraw. See also Mann. v. Beck, where the
commission would not withdraw on the basis of public policy. It may be noted that
for commissions with power to initiate enforceable complaints, the problem of withdrawal
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Some statutes authorize the commissions to initiate their own
complaints with the same enforcing power as is provided in the statute
for privately-initiated complaints.259 These commissions follow the
same general procedure used in private complaints, and the subject
matter is similar to the latter as well. A commission-initiated
investigation may, however, take the form of a survey covering a large
range of operations rather than one particular incident. Statutes pro-
viding for such power reflect a legislative intent that the function of
the commission be more than the adjudication of disputes between
private parties. Under such statutes the commission is conceived as
an aggressive public agency seeking to ferret out discriminatory
practices, first by persuasion and ultimately by coercion.
It is interesting to note that some commissions which are authorized
to initiate complaints have assumed the power to conduct formal
investigations without the formality of a complaint, on the theory
that such investigations are a necessary step in determining the facts
upon which to file a formal commission complaint. Other commissions,
faced with non-statutory power to formulate policies to effectuate the
purposes of their statutes, developed procedures, based upon the
device of the so-called unverified informal complaint, permitting them
to investigate on their own motion.260 No issue has arisen when the
subject of such investigation was within commission jurisdiction.
In the case of Board of Higher Education v. Carter,261 however, the
New York Commission, which lacks express statutory power to initiate
formal complaints, was challenged in its right to continue an informal
investigation of alleged discrimination in Queens College. The lower
court held that the Commission lacked such power, as the Board was
exempt under the statute. On appeal to the appellate division, the
majority of the court held that the respondent could not be subject
to the enforceable jurisdiction of the Commission since it was an"exempt employer" under the statute.262 A secondary question, as to
whether the New York Commission may conduct so-called informal
investigations for the purpose of study and recommendation, without
the receipt of a verified (formal) complaint, also was presented.
The majority of the court, upon examining the provisions of the
statute conferring general jurisdiction upon the Commission "to take
other action against discrimination" wherever it existed, with the
loses its importance. N.Y. SCAD, 1960 REP. NhoG. 126 (Spann v. Lansky Die Cutting
Corp.).
259. CoNx. GF.N. STAT. REV. § 31-127; N.J. REv. STAT. § 18:25-14; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, § 955; R.I. GENi. LAws ANN. § 28-5.
260. N.Y. SCAD, 1958 REP. Pnoc. 13.
261. 26 Misc. 2d 989, 213 N.Y.S.2d 132, modified, 16 App. Div. 2d 443, 228 N.Y.S.2d
704, modified, 14 N.Y.2d 138, 250 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1964).
262. 16 App. Div. 2d at 445-46, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 705-07.
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related powers enumerated in the statute, concluded that the Com-
mission had a right to conduct such investigations, surveys, studies,
reports and related activities in public education.2 6 3 Judge Stever,
dissenting, disagreed. 264 The Court of Appeals tacitly accepted the
existence of such power, while overruling the appellate division on
the exemption issue.
Apart from whether they are statutorily authorized to initiate their
own complaints, some commissions, such as Colorado's, have employed
these informal complaints sparingly on the theory that a better case
can be presented by a verified complaint.65 Others, such as Pennsyl-
vania's, employ the informal procedure only upon technical violations,
such as illegal newspaper advertisements or illegal application forms. 6
Still other commissions commence informal investigations only when
a reputable agency or interest group requests that they do so, and
only when they are furnished credible information that acts of
discrimination have been committed. These latter commissions believe
that informal investigations are more properly designed to ferret out
industry-wide job discrimination with better long range results than
formal investigation on a case by case basis. Thus, industry-wide
surveys are highly favored for informal investigation.2 67
A few commissions make wide use of this procedure both in investi-
gating particular cases and in investigations in the nature of a survey.
New York has invoked its non-enforceable jurisdiction by informal
complaint in instances where the subject matter of the investigation or
the parties involved may be such that the Commission could in no
event obtain enforceable jurisdiction. For example, when the parties
involved in the intended investigation are exempt by express statutory
exclusion or when the Commission is seeking a voluntary compliance,
jurisdiction has been granted. Another result is dictated when
investigation is instituted on the basis of information set forth in a
verified complaint, which must be discussed on jurisdictional grounds.
In these instances, the Commission has continued its investigation
when the facts of discrimination warrant informal continuance. Similar
cases arise when a respondent, excluded from the enforcement pro-
vision of the law, has affirmatively requested that the charge be dis-
posed of on the merits and the Commission has proceeded informally.
Complainants have also, on occasion, due to personal convenience or
fear of reprisal, sought to have the Commission employ the informal
263. 16 App. Div. 2d at 446-47, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 707-08. See text accompanying
notes 65-67 supra.
264. 16 App. Div 2d at 458-59, 228 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19.
265. Note, 74 HAlr. L. 1Ev. 526, 530 (1961).
266. Ibid.
267. MAss. CoizVk'N AGAINST DiscUmmiNATIoN, 14TH ANN. REP. 5 (1959).
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investigative apparatus rather than filing a formal complaint as a
"person aggrieved." In any event, the efficacy of this procedure has
been established.
268
Illustrative of the successful use of informal investigation in an
individual case is a much publicized case reported by the Massachu-
setts Commission, in which the NAACP and other organizations sub-
mitted a written request to the commission to investigate the employ-
ment policies of a local baseball club. The call for an investigation
was precipitated by the dropping of a Negro player, Elijah "Pumpsie"
Green, from the club prior to the end of spring training. The Com-
mission, after obtaining information from these organizations concern-
ing the club policies, met with the officials of the club in open
session and announced its decision to investigate. A little over two
months after the investigation commenced, the club arrived at a final
agreement which, in effect, guaranteed a non-discriminatory policy
in hiring and conditions of employment.269
Where statutory power resides with state officers such as the
Industrial or Labor Commissioner or the Attorney General,2 70 the
commission may request such officers, if the facts warrant, to file a
formal complaint. This obviates the necessity of relying upon their
non-enforceable jurisdiction by informal complaint. To date, the
success of the conciliation process has not required this procedure,
and, except in New York, no public official has acted on his own
initiative. 2
71
Statutes vary widely with respect to the time of filing of complaints
and to the statute of limitations. 272 California requires a complaint to
be filed within one year of the alleged wrong,273 whereas the New
York statute provides only a ninety day period.274 Some commissions,
such as California's, permit an extension beyond the statute of limita-
tion for an "aggrieved person" to obtain knowledge of the facts;275
268. E.g., N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP. PRoo. 36-37.
269. Supra note 267, at 6.
270. See note 4 supra and authorities cited therein.
271. The Attorney General of New York, in 1960, exercised the power to file a
complaint. N.Y. SCAD, 1960 REt. PROG. 125 (Lefkowitz v. Wells' Fargo Armored
Service Corp.). We may note that an amendment to § 297 of the Law Against
Discrimination has empowered the Attorney General to use subpoenas in connection
with his filing of complaints with SCAD. Laws of 1960, ch. 978, effective April 28,
1960.
272. Illustrative of the range of periods of limitations are the following: Oregon, 2
years (the 2-year statute of limitations in tort applies); Colorado, 6 months; Connecticut,
90 days; Illinois, 120 days; Kansas, 6 months; Massachusetts, 6 months; Michigan, 90
days; Minnesota, 6 months; Rhode Island, 1 year.
273. Cal. Labor Code § 1422.
274. N.Y. SCAD, R. 1hAc. & PRoc. 2(i) (1953).
275. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1422. The period may not exceed 90 days after obtaining
knowledge of the facts. CAL. FEPC, RurLs AND REGULATIONS 19002(d) (1960).
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others, such as New York's; make allowance for a discriminatory
practice of a continuing nature by permitting filing at any time be-
tween the date of the first unlawful acts and the date of their
termination.276 It must be noted, however, that few complaints are
filed after the limitation period.2 77
B. Investigation
After a complaint is filed, it is recorded and numbered. The pro-
ceedings of the larger independent commissions, such as New York's,
require that the complaint be examined by the executive director or
the equivalent chief administrative officer of the commission, who,
as part of his supervisory responsibilities, has the duty of transmitting
the complaint to the chairman or commission staff for subsequent
assignment.278
As a preliminary step to assignment to an investigating commis-
sioner, the chairman of the New York Commission examines each
complaint to determine whether the Commission is without enforce-
ment jurisdiction by reason of statutory exemptions or otherwise. If
it appears that the Commission has no jurisdiction, the chairman or
commissioner will dismiss. If there is reasonable doubt, the case may
be referred for investigation to develop the facts.27 9
Investigation procedures among the commissions show little con-
sideration for the rights of respondents, although in New York the
investigating field representatives, as a first investigatory step after
filing of the complaint, seek to obtain a personal interview with the
respondent.280 In general, respondents are often not apprised that
they are under investigation until a field trip is made to their office
or place of business, a practice convenient to the commission. Indeed,
even misrepresentation has been employed. Thus, investigators for the
Washington State Board Against Discrimination have on occasion
misrepresented themselves as "state investigators," in order to keep
respondents in the initial phase of an investigation from resisting the
furnishing of information and full disclosure.2 81
In any event, an investigation of an unlawful employment practice
may touch upon every phase in the respondents employment setup.
Thus, the methods of recruiting and usual sources of personnel, the
276. Supra note 272, 2(d).
277. In New York, a verified complaint must be filed within 90 days after the
alleged act of discrimination. If a complaint is filed beyond the 90 days, the com-
mission may retain jurisdiction if the statute of limitations is not pleaded as an afflrma-
tive defense (deemed waived). N.Y. SCAD, 1948 REP. PRoG. 50.
278. Id. at 12.
279. Ibid.
280. Id. at 13.
281. Note, supra note 265, at 534.
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contents of employment application blanks, job specifications, proce-
dures for hiring, promotion, wage scales, dismissal, and grievance
machinery are usually scrutinized during the course of an investigation.
The extent and depth of the agency investigation of a respondent
will depend largely upon the cooperation of the respondent and
the source out of which the complaint has arisen. On the latter point,
the commissions may more readily deal with it by telephone or letter.
On the other hand, alleged discrimination in hiring or promotion,
where there is conflict as to what was said or done, requires more
extensive investigation and factual analysis. Such an investigation
may quite often go beyond the question of the respective qualifications
of the complainant.
The majority of commissions are given statutory power to subpoena
witnesses, including employees, and to require the production for
examination of books or papers relating to any matter under investi-
gation. 82
Illustrations of the contentions regarding commission subpoena
power likely to be raised by respondents in other jurisdictions are
found in two recent commission cases: Sun and Splash Club v. Divi-
sion Against Discrimination,83 and Ragland v. City of Detroit.2u
In the former case, the New Jersey Commission commenced an action
on a complaint by eight Negroes who alleged that they had been re-
fused admittance to the club on the ground that it was private. In the
course of the ensuing investigation, the Commission sought to sub-
poena certain records to determine whether the club qualified as a
place of public accommodation and would thus fall within the jurisdic-
tion of the Commission. The respondent club asserted that the statute
does not authorize the use of subpoena while the Commission is in the
investigatory stage. The court, rejecting this contention, reasoned
that the statute must have contemplated the use of subpoena as a
necessary incident to determining commission jurisdiction.
In the latter case, the Michigan Commission demanded all em-
ployee records of the Detroit Board of Water Commissioners' Sewage
Treatment Plant in order to pass on the allegations that the Board
had discharged an employee in retaliation for filing a complaint with
the Commission. In a motion to quash the subpoena, the respondent
city contended that the opening of files would be destructive of
employee morale, and that it would be unfair to permit commission
282. N.Y. ExEcunvE LAw § 297(7). New York's phraseology is comprehensive: "To
... subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, administer oaths, take the testimony
of any person under oath, and in connection therewith to require the production for
examination of any books or papers relating to any matter under investigation."
283. Sun and Splash Club v. Division against Discrimination, 3 RAcE REL. L. RP.
726 (N.J. Super. 1957).
284. Micrl. FEPC, Claim No. 287 (1959).
1023
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
investigators to examine personnel files and draw conclusions there-
from without the presence of a representative of the respondent city
to observe what was being examined. However, a compromise satis-
fying the parties was reached.
The commissions of Oregon, Rhode Island, Alaska, Colorado,
Michigan, and Kansas have no statutory power to subpoena records
during the investigatory phase, and, as a result, effective administra-
tion is likely to be impaired considerably.
285
All commissions, by express statutory authority or incident to the
subpoena power, may obtain testimony of witnesses outside the
state by deposition on the motion of any commissioner. In one of
the few cases where such power was invoked, little difficulty was
encountered. The New York Commission found it necessary to obtain
the testimony of a witness who had served on the membership com-
mittee of the respondent labor organization in a case in which the
complainant applied for and was allegedly refused membership on the
basis of his creed. The witness resided in Stockholm, Sweden. After
the giving of notice and an opportunity to be heard was afforded the
attorneys for both the complainant and respondent, the investigating
commissioner issued an order requiring the witness to appear before a
consular representative of the United States Department of State in
Stockholm. The deposition was then forwarded to the Commission.2o
C. Probable Cause
The procedure of investigation normally comes to a close when the
investigator makes a formal determination as to whether probable
cause exists for crediting the allegations of the complaint. If the
commission, on recommendation of an investigating commissioner
or a staff investigator, does not find any unlawful employment prac-
tices, the case is closed.
The question as to whether the respondent may, by offering to
adopt the investigator's recommendations and thus terminate the pro-
ceedings, obviate the necessity of going to conference and conciliation
285. Colorado provides for subpoena powers for public bearings. The Commission
may issue a subpoena. Upon failure to obey, the Commission must petition the district
court for a subpoena. Disobedience of this subpoena is subject to contempt. The
Kansas Commission reports no handicap by the lack of subpoena power in the investi-
gatory stage. However, while they report most respondents cooperate, difficulties are
beginning to present themselves. KAN. Civm BicHrs Comme'N, 1962 RP. Pno(O. 4. In
Illinois, only the chairman of the board may issue subpoenas. ILL. REv. STAT. tit. 48,
§§ 9, 859 (1961). Michigan's commission must apply to the circuit court. Micu.
STAT. ANN. § 17.458(8) (1960). In Minnesota, the board may issue subpoenas signed
by at least two members. MINN. FEP, RuLEs OF PRACTCE (1956). In Wisconsin,
subpoena for the attendance of witnesses may be obtained by the parties upon request.
INDusTnL.L Comm'N FEP PnocEnurEs, RuLp, 18.
286. N.Y. SCAD, 1949 REP. PnoG. 29 (Schindler v. Council 29, Air Line Pilots).
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prior to a finding of probable cause has frequently presented itself.
While all FEP acts prescribe that once a formal determination of
probable cause has been made, a commission must proceed to confer-
ence and conciliation, many commissions will procedurally permit the
termination of proceedings at an appropriate time prior to a formal
determination of probable cause.287 The investigating procedures of
Pennsylvania and Minnesota expressly provide for the negotiation of a
settlement at any time prior to a finding of probable cause.
The question whether a denial of due process results upon a finding
of probable cause in which there was an absence of the right to a
preliminary hearing and an opportunity to be heard by witnesses
has been raised before at least one commission. In this case, re-
spondents have sought to liken a commission proceeding under the
FEP statute to that of a criminal case where a right to a preliminary
hearing before a magistrate and a formal finding of evidence sufficient
to warrant further proceedings are required before being compelled
to submit to public hearing before the commission. The Michigan
Commission, in denying the above contention, held that in a civil
administrative proceeding the rules and law pertaining to a criminal
proceeding are inapplicable, and, after examining the language of
the Michigan FEP statute, concluded that it did not contemplate a
formal advisory proceeding for its finding of probable cause.
2 88
The procedural rules of many commissions provide for the right
to apply for reconsideration of dismissal for lack of probable cause,
but this is within the discretion of the commission. In these states,
the applications are required to be in writing and filed within a
given number of days or within a reasonable time after the mailing of
the notice of dismissal.2 9 Pennsylvania's statute expressly authorizes
287. See N.Y. SCAD, 1955 REP. PROG. 46. There the New York Commission con-
trasted the New York Labor Relations Board with the Commission as to the issuance of
a complaint. The Board may or may not issue a complaint as a matter of policy.
Under the Law Against Discrimination, after a finding of probable cause, the Com-
mission must proceed to conference, conciliation and persuasion. However, a formal
finding of probable cause is not a condition precedent for a satisfactory settlement.
Thus, an employer, owner of a restaurant, flied a verified complaint against one of
his waitresses, a white person, charging her conduct and behavior toward a fellow
employee, a Negro cook, as discriminatory. The investigating commissioner found
that the waitress apologized to the cook before the union's anti-discrimination com-
mittee. The union undertook to have the respondent apologize at a shop meeting
as well. Other facts, such as the employer's failure to reprimand or admonish the
waitress, and the lack of evidence that the cook ever protested his treatment by
the respondent waitress, led the investigating commissioner to hold that the remedial
purposes of the Law were satisfactorily achieved. N.Y. SCAD, 1950 REP. PRoc. 53.
(Jaydean Restaurant, Inc. v. Engel).
288. Cohen v. River Rouge Savings Bank, Claim No. 1050, Mich. FEPC.
289. Fifteen days, New York, Michigan; right to appeal no specified period-"within
reasonable time," Wisconsin; seven days, Connecticut; ten days, Ohio, Colorado, Kansas,
Pennsylvania; thirty days, Washington, Missouri, California.
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the commission to hear an appeal from a dismissal,290 and the statutes
of Michigan and Ohio expressly provide for judicial review.2 1 In the
absence of a specific provision, the commission's affirmation or reversal,
on appeal, of a dismissal for lack of probable cause would seem to
be judicially reviewable under the general statutory provision pro-
viding for the judicial review of commission orders. 212 This question
was first presented in New York. In Jeanpierre v. Arbury,2 93 the com-
plainant instituted an article 7829 proceeding in the supreme court to
review a dismissal for lack of probable cause. The application was
denied on grounds that the New York statute provided no intermediate
or preliminary determination of commission decisions, but only those
made after formal hearing under oath. On appeal to the appellate
division, the court, dealing primarily with this latter issue, went into
the question of whether there was legislative intent to permit a
submission.
In construing the language of the statute as denying the right to
interim review, the court reasoned,
There appears to be a careful and consistent legislative design to grant
judicial review in certain specific situations and to preclude such review in
others. [The statute in specifying judicial review after formal bearing, there-
fore, barred] . . . similar review where the right had not been explicitly
granted.
295
The court of appeals, although sustaining the appellate division on
290. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964).
291. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.458(8) (1960); Omo REv. CODE ANm. § 4112.06
(Anderson 1964).
292. Note, supra note 265, at 572. Reviews of commission determination of probable
cause have varied in procedure. California has held that a finding of no probable
cause is reviewable by mandamus. Massachusetts permits a review to determine
whether it is arbitrary or capricious by a writ of certiorari. Oregon expressly precludes
review of a dismissal for lack of probable cause by restricting appeal from Commission
orders only after a public hearing; however, appeals have been taken to the Attorney
General and then to the Governor. The reviewability of Commission action short of a
determination of probable cause presents an interesting question. In Carter, the Com-
mission, apart from claiming jurisdiction, challenged the appropriateness of a proceed-
ing under article 78 of the old Civil Practice Act to appeal to the Commission's right
to investigate. The Commission contended that the appeal was premature, in the
absence of a final determination or order. There was no determination, as the investiga-
tion went no further than the complaint stage. The Commission further contended
that the writ of prohibition or mandamus was inappropriate for the appeal. The
former restrains a body or officer from exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function
only; the latter was inappropriate to grant negative injunctive relief under the facts.
The Commission observed that the remaining provisions of the article were similarly
inappropriate. The argument was rejected by the lower court and the appellate
division assumed jurisdiction without explicit comment.
293. 3 App. Div. 2d 514, 162 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1957).
294. Art. 78, § 1296 of the old Civil Practice Act is now superseded by §§ 7803-04
of the Civil Practice Law. No substantial change has been made.
295. Supra note 293, at 517, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
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the grounds that the commission's determination of a lack of probable
cause was supported by substantial evidence, held to the contrary
when addressing itself to the question of the right to interim review
by saying,
No intent to preclude judicial review of such determination [probable cause]
may be found in the language of Article 15 of the Executive Law nor from
its legislative history. The rule is well settled that, in the absence of a
'clear expression by the legislature to the contrary,' the court may review
discretionary acts of an administrative officer or body to determine whether
the discretion has been exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
296
At present there is no statutory provision for reconsideration of a
determination of probable cause by a commission.
Apart from the definition of probable cause as "a reasonable cause to
believe that the complainant may have been discriminated against,
viewing the record as a whole," there is no reasonably well formulated
standard as to its meaning and application in a given case. The
elements which may constitute probable cause to credit the allegations
in a complaint cannot always be precisely defined. Hundreds of
variant factors may be present in every case. Circumstantial evidence
sufficient to persuade one investigator of the presence of discrimina-
tion may be unconvincing to another. Subjective judgments of
personality traits likely to be prejudicial are often difficult to deter-
anine. In a specific case, it may not be possible to satisfy all the
purely legal requisites of proof of discrimination. Then too, there
is always a tendency to rest a finding of probable cause only on
such evidence as would sustain the allegations in a subsequent
public hearing.
Nevertheless, in advertising and pre-employment inquiry com-
plaints, the application of "probable cause" has become somewhat
standardized. In cases alleging discrimination in advertisements and
in written or oral pre-employment inquiries, the commission need
only show that the language used falls within the published lists
of illegal pre-employment inquiries or specific commission rulings to
establish a prima facie case. The failure of the employer to success-
fully plead the defense of bona fide occupational qualification or other
exemption, would result in a finding of probable cause.
In simple employment cases where there is an application and
refusal, the following information would normally make out a prima
facie case: (a) the complainant's qualifications meet the specifications
of the job, (b) the complainant's qualifications are superior to the
successful applicant's or to the other rejected applicants' (c) the num-
296. 4 N.Y.2d 238, 240, 149 N.E.2d 882, 883 (1958).
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ber of employees who are members of complainant's group is relatively
low, and (d) an examination of prevailing and past patterns of
employment, including sources and methods of recruitment, shows
that they are calculated to discriminate.297
The finding of probable cause, however, need not be predicated
upon or confined to a set or combination of elements as outlined
above. In a New York case advancing this proposition, the respondent
allegedly rejected the physical appearance of complainant. This objec-
tion was subsequently found, in the opinion of the commission, to be
factually erroneous. Complainant, a Negress, sought a position as
flight hostess with respondent's airline company. After passing the
required physical and mental examinations, she was rejected by the
company because of her appearance; specifically, a "poor complexion,"
"unattractive teeth," and "legs that were not shapely." The investi-
gating commissioner, upon observing complainant's physical appear-
ance, stated that,
I am of the opinion that when complainant applied for the position of
flight hostess with the respondent, she met all of the qualifications specified;
education, weight, height, appearance, health and being single. We are
unanimous in our opinion that respondent's objections to complainant's
physical appearance are not factually accurate. 298
Had respondent been vague with regard to complainant's appearance,
it would seem that it would have been more difficult to determine
that prejudice was involved in the rejection.
It is arguable that a reasonably well formulated standard and a
certain uniformity of application would result if the ultimate issue in
discrimination cases, namely the credibility of respondents, were to
constitute a minimum basis for a finding of probable cause. The issue
of probable or no probable cause would revolve solely on the inability
of the investigator to say with reasonable certainty that the rejection
of the complainant was due to factors other than discrimination.
The efficacy of this approach could be seen in a situation where there
is an application and refusal by a respondent for employment or
membership in a labor union. The burden of proof would then
shift to respondent, and if respondent failed to give a credible
explanation, a finding of probable cause would result. This is in
contrast to the need of the investigator to make out a prima facie
case of requisite elements which would measurably increase the
quantum of evidence necessary to sustain a finding.
299
297. Carter, Practical Considerations of Anti-Discrimination Legislation-Experience
Under the New York Law Against Discrimination, 40 Comq=r L.Q. 40, 46 (1954).
298. N.Y. SCAD, 1947 REP. PRoc. 49. (Franklin v. Transworld Airlines, Inc.).
299. Ore. FEP Law, First Public Hearing (August 1961). The quantum of evidence
sufficient for a prima facie case has at times been light. Thus, the Oregon Commis-
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D. Conference, Conciliation and Persuasion
The statutes of all FEP jurisdictions provide for conference, con-
ciliation and persuasion as a mandatory procedure after the finding
of probable cause. °0  The intended purpose of this procedure is to
afford respondent the opportunity-short of formal commission adjudi-
cation with its attendant stigma-first, to negotiate an adjustment of
the unfair employment practice; second, to prevent its recurrence;
and third, to bring, if necessary, his employment practices, policies and
methods into compliance with the letter and spirit of the Law Against
Discrimination.301 In support of this purpose, the terms of conciliation
are designed to give a respondent an opportunity to make the
transition from a policy of discrimination to that of non-discrimination
in an orderly fashion, and to inaugurate this new policy in such a
manner that it becomes a part of the normal employment procedure.
Conciliation agreements are thought to be primarily induced by
the presence of coercion, whether by having the respondent face the
prospect of a public hearing followed by court enforcement or, if
exonerated, being submitted to the unfavorable notoriety frequently
attached to a charge of discrimination. Although coercion is often
the prime catalyst in conciliation proceedings, its effectiveness varies
considerably with the respondents personality and the nature of his
business activities. For example, employers who sell services and
products directly to the general public under brand names or trade
marks are more amenable to conciliation, at least at the outset, than
industrial manufacturers selling small metal parts indirectly to the
trade for further processing. Those employment agencies or unions
whose services are offered directly to the general public and whose
names are frequently seen in the press or trade magazines are also
particularly sensitive to any smear upon their reputation.
Most commissioners and their staffs agree that educational persua-
sion plays a most valuable role in the conciliation procedure. In fact,
educational methods to effectuate public acceptance of FEP legisla-
tion are considered of primary importance. New York Commissioner
Elmer Carter some years ago emphasized this point:
The Law Against Discrimination is not without sanctions. But the success
sion made a finding of probable cause on the complaint of a Negro rejected for union
membership by secret ballot, where there was present in the history of the union a
consistent pattern of exclusion of Negroes.
300. E.g., N.Y. ExEcTrrIvE LAw § 297. "[I]f such commissioner shall determine after
such investigation that probable cause exists for crediting the allegations of the com-
plaint, he shall immediately endeavor to eliminate the unlawful discriminatory practice
complained of by conference, conciliation and persuasion."
301. This is the irreducible minimum. In New York, the respondent is also required
to display the commission poster. Ross v. Arbury, 206 Misc. 74, 133 N.Y.S.2d 62, aff'd,
285 App. Div. 886, 139 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1955).
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of its administration was deemed not to depend upon results obtained from
the application of its punitive provisions, but rather upon the development of
techniques of conferences, persuasion and conciliation. 302
The opportunities to examine the rationale of the respondent's con-
tentions, the dissection of myths and rumors, and the subtle or other-
wise indirect appeals to the fundamental ideals of Judeo-Christian
morality and the American creed, have proven to be contributing
factors in coming to a just conciliation agreement.
The success of conciliation, attested to by the relatively few
disputes reaching litigation, has been attributed by some to the fact
that conference technique, the heart of the conciliation process,
presents no real difficulty; that a sort of amiable chat between the
respondent and the investigating commissioner ensues. On the con-
trary, conferences are often prolonged and present a test of skill and
endurance. The investigating commissioner is not only engaged in
settling a simple complaint; he is engaged in the effort to change an
attitude, a habit of mind and action. Unless he can achieve this, the
permanence of the settlement itself may be greatly in doubt.
303
So important have some commissions viewed the patience and
understanding required for, inter alia, successful conciliation, that
executive directors of commissions have been replaced for their
failure or inability to exhibit these traits. Even when the power of
commission coercion is considerable with respect to a given re-
spondent, experienced conciliators have generally approached negotia-
tions in a spirit of compromise. Adamant refusal of employment by
a respondent is not categorically rejected as such by commissions,
provided the equity of the case justifies granting concessions. Illustra-
tive of this principle is a case involving a request that back pay be
withdrawn in return for concessions by the respondent;304 or the
case of a New York complainant's agreement to have her complaint
conditionally withdrawn upon the respondent's employment of another
girl whom he deemed qualified.30 5
Typical of the inflexible approach of some commissions is the ruling
of the Attorney General, as chief legal counsel for the Oregon Civil
Rights Commission, to the effect that the Commission may not com-
302. Carter, supra note 297, at 46. "No one can reasonably believe that deep
rooted prejudice...
303. Ibid.
304. Note, supra note 265, at 541.
305. N.Y. SCAD, 1958 REP,. Peoc. 15. This involved employment by an airline, where
a public hearing constituted notice in 1958. A new approach was used in this in-
stance. The complainant agreed to the employment of another Negro girl whom the




promise any rights of complainant in a conciliation conference. In
an Oregon proceeding, the investigator largely plays the role of a
prosecutor who presents the grounds for his findings of probable
cause. The respondent presents his side of the case. Conciliation
terms are then drafted which the respondent may accept or reject.
If these terms of conciliation are rejected, the investigator's office
reports this fact to the Labor Commissioner for a decision as to
whether the case should be scheduled for a public hearing. This
procedure rules out the element of persuasion and re-education, except
where the respondent experiences, on his own initiative, a change of
heart. The Commission thus relies excessively upon the investigator's
finding of probable cause.306
All state commissions employ standard procedures for follow-up
review of cases which have been conciliated. Frequently, authorized
follow-up investigations are incorporated in the terms of conciliation.
In New York, the commission has a policy of reviewing complaints
approximately six months after closing the file to determine whether
additional inquiry is necessary, and the investigating commissioner
may direct that there be additional reviews. Commissions showing
this continuing interest accomplish a double purpose: first, they
insure that the conciliation agreement has been carried out, and,
secondly, they observe whether changes have taken place in the
employment patterns or practices. 30 7 Many commissions have sought
to standardize conciliation agreements to the extent of incorporating
certain minimum requirements in them in addition to the varying
affirmative actions which they deem contingent upon the equities
present in each case. The number of these minimum requisites varies,
but all commissions provide that their respective conciliation agree-
ments contain at least a cease and desist order against all unlawful
employment practices charged and substantiated in the complaint.
One of the better representatives of this standardized approach is
the New York Commission. Their conciliation agreement generally
comprehends four requirements, the first of which is an immediate
elimination of all existing violations of the law as disclosed by
investigation. Thus, New York goes beyond the remedial action
implicit in the particular complaint.30 8 The elimination of unfair
306. Note, supra note 265, at 541.
307. N.Y. SCAD, 1956 REP. PRoG. 17-22.
308. The commission is confronted with an awkward situation when. it finds, in the
course of an investigation, other acts of discrimination corresponding to a general
pattern. It may have no particular complainant who is qualified. To order respondent
to hire a specific number of persons of minority groups would require the respondent
to seek out members of a particular racial or religious group, and not consider them
on a non-discriminatory basis. In New York, an employer once requested the Com-
mission to assist him in recruiting. The Commission declared that applicants must
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employment practices is based upon the power of the Commission to
apply for a cease and desist order expressly provided by statute, 09
and all commission statutes similarly provide. Otherwise, with respect
to the remaining requirements, the broad phraseology of all commis-
sion statutes grants wide discretion for the relief of the complainant.
The second minimum requirement in New York is that respondent
obey the law; this is generally preceded by a detailed explanation by
the investigating commissioner. Thirdly, the respondent must commit
himself to displaying a commission poster in a conspicuous and
lighted place where employees, applicants for employment or, in the
case of labor unions, applicants for union membership, may see it.
3 10
Finally, the New York Commission demands that it be allowed to
make periodic re-inspections of the respondent's employment patterns,
practices and policies, and to examine records incident to such
review.
3 11
In addition to the requisites outlined above, there are particular
remedies which provide for direct vindication of the complainant him-
self for the wrong he has suffered at the hands of the respondent, and
protect him against further wrongful acts of the respondent.312 There
is little doubt that the aforementioned remedies are within the power
of the commission. Commission statutes either expressly or implicitly
empower commissions to vindicate the complainant by ordering the
hiring, reinstating or upgrading of complainant, with or without pay;
or, in the case of the labor union, to admit or restore complainant
to membership.
313
In referral or dismissal cases, however, the attempt to make whole
a particular complaint presents difficulties. When the position in
question has been filled, the commission may order respondent to
be judged on merit, and recommended additional reemployment reference sources.
N.Y. SCAD, 1954 REP. PRoG. 52. In addition, the Commission believed that courts
would be reluctant to enforce an order which has been violated, in the absence of a
specific complaint. Therefore, a broad affirmative order requiring periodic reporting,
and requirements broadening the employment base has been upheld.
309. Markey v. Marketime Drugs, Inc., No. E-575, 1960 WAsH. STATE BD. AGAINST
DISCRimxnATON. If an individual complainant is found to have been discriminated
against and is no longer interested in the employment, and a general pattern of
discrimination is not present, a cease and desist order may be the only appropriate
remedy.
310. N.Y. SCAD, 1956 REP. FROG. 60-61. The validity of such commission regula-
tion has been upheld, on appeal, in Ross v. Arbury, supra note 301. Note that the
penal provision, § 299, "willfully violate an order of the Commission," has been applied
in cases where respondents failed to display posters. See Schwartz v. Technical Service
Agency.
311. Spitz, Patterns of Conciliation Under the New York Law Against Discrimination,
(pt. II), 74 N.Y.L.J. (April 6, 9, 10 & 12, 1951).
312. Id. at (pt. I), 7.
313. N.Y. ExcuTrrvE LAW § 297.
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hire complainant to fill the first vacancy, depending upon the rate
of turnover, the condition of the respondent's business, and the
nature of the industry.314 Often, the only practicable solution is the
payment of compensation for loss of earnings (back pay), although
compensation certainly is not an ideal adjustment of the complaint.
315
Indeed, the question of whether the commission, on a finding of
probable cause, should require the more drastic remedy of immediate
employment of a complainant even if it compels the dismissal of a
person who has been hired to fill the vacancy, illustrates the difficulty
of providing complete relief for the complainant. 'The New York
Commission has rejected the view that the immediate employment
of a complainant is the only adequate restoration of his civil rights
and that the necessary personnel adjustment is the concern of the
respondent. The Commission, in defense of what it believes to be the
greater good, has sought to place its emphasis on alternative relief
such as back pay. This is preferable to an atmosphere fraught with
bitterness and resentment, a condition which might well follow the
abrupt dismissal of a person who in no way was responsible for
discrimination.
3 16
Conciliation agreements vary with respect to the degree of formality
required. In some states they take the form of an official consent
order drawn up by the commission staff and submitted to the
respondent for his signature. In New York, conciliation agreements
normally consist merely of an interchange of correspondence between
the investigating commissioner and the respondent or his authorized
agent. Occasionally, a conciliation agreement will consist of a written
statement of the terms of adjustment concluded in oral conference
prepared by the commission and transmitted to respondent. When
314. In Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Airlines, Inc., the Com-
mission issued a cease and desist order, ordering respondent to enroll complainant in
its next training class. The airline raised the question of the constitutionality of the
Commission's jurisdiction in interstate commerce. The Colorado Supreme Court held
the Commission could not issue the order because it would unconstitutionally burden
interstate commerce. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed. 149 Col.
1259, 368 P.2d 970 (1962), reversed, 372 U.S. 714 (1963).
315. Spitz, supra note 307, at 8. Back pay orders are statutorily authorized in many
commission states. The New York Conmission has awarded back pay to complainants
for periods in excess of a year. Generally, it is required that the complainant make a
reasonable effort to minimize loss, and often the awards have been compromised sums.
In granting a back pay order which is analogous to an award of damages, a com-
mission should, consistent with the usual rules of damages applied in breach of employ-
ment contract cases, weigh the complainant's attempt to mitigate damages and consider
his earnings during the time he was barred from employment. We may note that the
New York Temporary Commission, aware of the back pay provision of the statute,
requires the complaint to be filed within 90 days.
316. No commission is reported to have required the discharge of an innocent
successful applicant to accommodate complainant.
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repeated complaints are sustained against a respondent, however, the
commission will require his signature on the consent order.317
A wide range of approaches have been taken by the various states
in regard to confidentiality in conciliation proceedings. Some statutes
provide that conciliation agreements shall be unqualifiedly confi-
dential.318 New York provides for secrecy in all matters disclosed
by investigation and subsequent conciliation. 319 Colorado has extended
non-disclosure, even to the filing of a complaint, by regulation al-
though investigating officials are permitted to testify concerning
matters involved in conciliation which were previously revealed by
investigation.320 Still others are told that their proceedings in general
are to be confidential.321
Secrecy, however, is apparently not deemed to be an indispensable
commission policy, as may be seen from the statutes of Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, Connecticut and Minnesota. In Massachusetts and Con-
necticut, disclosure is permitted when the terms of conciliation have
been adjusted.322 Similarly, in Pennsylvania, terms of adjustment may
be disclosed.323 Minnesota permits disclosure of matters involved
317. It is to be noted that the trend is away from the informal incorporation of
conciliation agreement provisions in letters to respondents, and toward the more formal
consent order. The latter is held to be more desirable in that it spells out the remedy
for the complainant as well as the general policies to be followed by the respondent,
including his responsibilities in follow-up supervision. In addition, the stipulations In
the order are reached by consent of all parties, including the commission, and thus pro-
vide a substantial legal basis for enforcement of its provisions.
318. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1421; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1005 (Supp. 1959);
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.458 (1960); N.J. REv. STAT. § 18:25-14 (Supp. 1964); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59-4-10(b) (1953); N.Y. ExEcI-rvE LAw § 297. Violation by a member
of the commission subjects this person to disciplinary action under the State Civil
Service Act. WASH. STATE BD. AGAINST DisCRiMINATnoN, R. PRAc. & Pnoc. 3 (non-
disclosure by regulation; board may publish any complaint that has been conciliated).
319. N.Y. ExEcur=v LAw § 297. See also N.Y. ADmmansTRAIW CODE § X41 10
(9) (Supp. 1961). "After the filing of any complaint, the chairman of the commission
shall designate . . . to make ... prompt investigation in connection therewith ...he
shall immediately endeavor to eliminate ... by conference, conciliation and persuasion.
The members of the commission and its staff shall not disclose what has transpired
in the course of such endeavors." Supra note 272, 3(4). N.Y. SCAD, B. PnAc. &
Paoc. 3(c) (1953). Commission rules of procedure provide for no disclosure only
with respect to conference, conciliation and persuasion. Also, the Report of the
Temnorary Commission interpreting the statute, alluded only to conciliation.
320. Colorado permits disclosure if made prior to the conduct of the commission's
general investigation. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-24-7 (4) (Supp. 1960); COLO.
ANTi-DscRmINATON CommN, R. PRAC. & PRoc. 3(d) (1959).
321. N.Y. ADmiNiSTRA=vE CODE § X41 10(9) (Supp. 1961).
322. CONN. GEN. STAT. Rmv. § 31-127 (1960); MAss. ANAT. LAws ch. 1511, § 5
(1957); MAss. Comse'N AGAINST DiScuMIwNATION, R. PEAC. & Pnoc. 2(5) (1961).
"The members of the Commission and its staff shall not disclose what has occurred
in the course of concilation conferences, provided, however, that the Commission
may publish the facts of any complaint which has been dismissed, and the terms of
conciliation when the complaint has been disposed of."
323. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959 (1964). See also PA. HUMIAN RIGHTS COAMI'N
REG. § 110.01 (1961).
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in conciliation. This, however, is restricted to non-specific material.
Illinois, on the other hand, requires the consent of the respondent for
disclosure. 324
Thus, in the case of informal investigations involving no enforceable
jurisdiction, commissions exercise discretion and dispense with re-
quirements of non-disclosure of information under certain circum-
stances. In general, a policy of secrecy has not been practiced con-
sistently with regard to information obtained in the investigations of
the various commissions. In New York, for example, the Commission
for several years included the names of respondents in its annual report
of cases.325 Washington's State Board Against Discrimination is an
example of a commission which has only recently reversed its policy
from one of secrecy to one of inviting the general public to all its
meetings, distributing an agenda of cases to be discussed in advance,
and providing mimeographed copies of the investigator's report and
recommendations.26
The respondent, if ultimately dissatisfied with the terms of con-
ciliation as laid down by the commission, may await the public
hearing. Apart from the Washington statute,327 however, none of
the FEP acts contains a specific provision for reconsideration of a
conciliation agreement or the terms offered by the commission to the
respondent. Commissions such as those of New York, Pennsylvania,
Colorado and Connecticut, however, provide a procedure for recon-
sideration of a complaint through their general powers to prescribe
suitable regulations for the commission.
328
New York, Colorado and Michigan, in order to insure the com-
plainant of an opportunity to file for reconsideration, require the
investigating commissioner, in the case of New York, and the staff
member, in the cases of Colorado and Michigan, who negotiated the
tenns of conciliation, to serve on the complainant a copy of the
agreement. The complainant must thereupon file a timely application
for reconsideration. Applications are granted at the discretion of
either the chairman of the commission or the individual commissioners.
In these states the commission, upon granting the application, may
amend the terms of conciliation or refer the case to an investigating
324. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 853 (Smith-Hurd 1964). Illinois permits disclosure
upon written consent of respondents. Mnr. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(6) (1957). Min-
nesota permits disclosure, but not its efforts in a particular case.
325. Compare N.Y. SCAD, 1957 REi. PRoa., with N.Y. SCAD, 1958 REP. fRoG.
326. As to the "open hearings," see foreword in WAsHr. STATE Bom AGAINST Dis-
cRnmNAT N, 1959 REP. PRoG. 3.
327. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.260 (1962).
328. COLO. ANTI-DiscRIMINATION CONM'N, B. PRAC. & PRoc. 4 (1959); CoNN. Ci-nL
RiGEm CoM2'N, R. & REG. § 371-16 (1960); N.Y. SCAD, R. PRAc. & Pnoc. 4 (1953);
PA. HumAN RIGMrs COmb'N REG. § 102-08 (1961).
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examiner with recommendation for further investigation or concilia-
tion. In New York, the chairman of the commission performs this
function.
329
Questions arise as to whether a right to judicial appeal lies upon a
refusal to reconsider, with respect to both those states which provide
such a procedure by statute or regulation and those which lack such
a procedure. It would appear, from the reasoning applicable to the
right to judicial appeal from a dismissal for lack of probable cause,
that conciliation agreements would be subject to appeal if they were
found to be arbitrary or capricious.
E. Enforcement
Whoever represents the commission at conciliation, whether an
investigating commissioner or staff member, is required, upon his
failure to resolve the alleged violation, to make a report to the
entire commission. This procedure is required by all commissions.
Most commission procedures give the commission a wide latitude
of action. The commission may request that the same or a different
official reinvestigate or endeavor to reach a satisfactory settlement.
On the other hand, the commission may proceed to set the case for
public hearing. Most commissions require a quorum vote of the
commission before proceeding to the public hearing stage. In Cali-
fornia, however, a single commissioner may call a hearing. 30 In
Oregon and Alaska, the consent of the State Commissioner of Labor,
who sits as a one-man commission at public hearings, is required.331
New York and Rhode Island permit this question to be determined
by their own investigating commissioners who are required, upon
failure at conciliation, to proceed directly to public hearing.332 In
any event, the procedure at this stage becomes more formal and the
rules of civil procedure are followed.
Most commissions are required by statute to serve upon the
respondent a written notice of hearing together with the complaint.
313
The notice states the time and place of hearing, and informs the
respondent that he is required to file a written verified answer to
the complaint in person or by attorney within a specified number
of days. Answers may contain a general or specific denial of every
329. Colorado: Ibid.; New York: Ibid.
330. CAL. LAnoR CoDE § 1423.
331. ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.060 (Supp. 1959). ALxsKA STAT. § 23.10.215 (1962).
332. N.Y. SCAD, R. PnAc. & PRoc. 5 (1953). R.I. R. PRAc. & Pnoc. Art. IV (1949).
333. N.Y. EXEcuV LAw § 297, is typical. "In case of failure to eliminate such
practices, or an advance thereof ... he shall cause to be issued and served in the
name of the Commission a written notice ......
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allegation of the complaint denied by the respondent and may be
based on information and belief or a denial of any knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief. Any matter constituting a
defense may be pleaded.
Most commissions allow respondents the opportunity, as a matter
of right, to amend pleadings prior to hearing.334 The failure to answer
the complaint does not permit commissions under their procedure to
immediately issue an order. Before a decision is made, a hearing is
required, testimony taken, and findings of fact made.
335
Most commissions are not parties to the action until an order has
been issued and sought to be enforced. In California and Oregon, the
commissions officially enter the case when the hearing stage is
reached. In California, an accusation is served on the respondent by
the investigating commissioner in the name of the entire commission.336
In Oregon, the Administrator of the Civil Rights Division or Director
of the Senior Workers Division may file a petition with the Commis-
sion of Labor requesting a cease and desist order from the Commission
against the respondent. At this point the Commission becomes a party
to the action. The Commissioner of Labor then designates a staff
attorney from the Attorney Generars office to conduct the hearing
on behalf of the Commission. 3 7
Once the determination is made to proceed to hearing, no specific
statutory provision or regulation is available authorizing a reconsidera-
tion of the commission decision and it is doubtful that the statutes
contemplate, or due process requires, a second review once a court
has already considered the legality of the terms of conciliation. The
question as to the availability of interlocutory relief after the com-
mission's decision to proceed and prior to a final determination at
public hearing is an open one. No statute or commission regulation
specifically provides for interlocutory relief as such, yet it would
appear that such relief would be incidental to effectuating the com-
plainant's remedy.
The Massachusetts Commission, in Marshall v. Equi,338 sought to
obtain a temporary injunction to enjoin the respondent from selling
realty to another buyer. The court, in refusing this relief in the
334. See notes 23-26 supra.
335. PA. HuamA Rimrs Coav'N REG. § 104.09 (1961).
336. CAL. FEPC, R. & RG. IV (a). This procedure enables the commission to
redraft the complaint on the basis of new facts elicited during investigation. However,
all statutes permit a commission to amend a complaint before public hearing.
337. ORE. ButrmAu oF L noR, CIvIL RIGHTs Div., RuExs oF ADMuN. Pnoc. 5 (I)
(1959).
338. No. 76678, Mass. Supreme Ct., Suffolk County (March 1960).
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absence of express statutory authorization, declared that the Commis-
sion must await the pending investigation and hearing. It would
seem that in the case of discrimination in employment the result
would be similar.
The court is not disposed to read such implied power into the
applicable statute when it would be required to weigh the opposing
equities in the balancing of relative injury between complainant
and respondent in employment, and also be required to determine
the question as to the likelihood of the complainant prevailing at the
hearing and being entitled to a permanent injunction.
Other interlocutory relief, apart from injunctions, has been con-
sidered. In a Washington case, the State Board Against Discrimina-
tion filed a notice of lis pendens and moved to have a receivership
appointed for a house which had been offered for sale, the respondent
allegedly having refused to sell for a discriminatory reason. The
motion was withdrawn before it was decided upon by the court,
when the respondent committed himself not to dispose of the realty.
3
1
Most commission hearing boards are made up of commissioners.
Washington, California and Oregon, however, choose hearing exami-
ners from a list of interested and qualified people. New Jersey's
statute authorizes the commissioner to appoint a hearing examiner
in his place.34° In those states where commissioners are unsalaried,
the commissioners usually are scattered throughout the state, arid
obtaining a necessary quorum for a hearing board may prove difficult.
Once convened, however, all commission hearings are open to the
public.
With regard to the rules of evidence, the majority of FEP acts con-
tain the conventional provision "that the hearing tribunal shall not
be bound by the strict rules of evidence prevailing in courts of Law
or Equity." This provision is found in the statutes of such states as
Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. The Rhode Island statute also
contains a provision authorizing the commission,
to take into account all evidence, statistical or otherwise, which may tend to
prove the existence of a predetermined pattern of employment or member-
ship; provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to authorize
or require any employer or labor organization to employ or admit applicants
for employment or membership in the proportion which their race or color,
religion or country of ancestral origin bears to the total population or in
accordance with any criterion other than the individual qualifications of
the applicant.341
339. Note, 74 HAnv. L. Rzv. 526, 551 (1960).
340. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-8(1) (1945).
341. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-5-22 (1949).
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In Connecticut and Washington, the administrative agencies
charged with responsibility to enforce the law against discrimination
are authorized to make their own rules of practice to expedite hear-
ing procedures.3 In Alaska, Kansas, Michigan, Oregon and Wiscon-
sin, the statutes are silent as to which rules of evidence prevail at the
administrative hearings.
343
The California FEP statute merely provides that the state Adminis-
trative Procedure Act shall govern the admissibility of evidence and
other procedural questions at administrative hearings conducted by
the commission. In effect, this provision incorporates by reference the
conventional provision that the strict rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law or equity do not prevail at administrative hearings.3"
Thus, wide discretion, as a matter of practice, is left to the chairmen
of hearing boards, as to when the conventional rules of evidence in
administrative hearings apply. Almost all commissions exclude hearsay
evidence and leading questions, normally acceptable in administra-
tive hearings. Oregon's commission, -however, permits such questions
if the right of cross-examination is given.345 Apart from this area, the
traditional procedural pattern prevails; witnesses are sworn,M both
sides present evidence, objections and motions are made, and findings
of fact, issues and orders are entered.
The commission's case is presented by its own attorney, or, under
the terms of some statutes, the Attorney General or one of his assist-
ants. In the majority of states, the complainant is permitted, by
express statute or by regulation, to be represented by counsel; all
respondents are entitled under the same statutes or regulations to
legal representation.
Proof of discrimination has presented difficulties. First, refusal to
hire, promote or classify may be attributed to a wide variety of
reasons, many of which are lawful under the statute. Some FEP
statutes, such as Rhode Island's and Ohio's, attempt to deal with this
problem by expressly providing that the commission is to take into
account all the existence of a predetermined pattern of employment or
342. These commissions follow the usual rules of evidence in administrative deter-
minations. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 31-125 (1962).
343. In these jurisdictions, rules of evidence not otherwise provided for by statute
or commission procedure are governed by the applicable rules in suits in equity under
the respective state's administrative procedure rules. Thus, in Kansas, the Commission
shall be bound by the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of equity, and only
relevant evidence of reasonable probative value is receivable.
344. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1424.
345. OE. Rur.s or Ainnr. Pnoc. 13(6) (1960). "Hearsay evidence shall not be
admissible over an objection based on lack of opportunity to cross-examine."
346. Id., (2). Testimony, by stipulation of both parties, may be taken without an
oath, but such evidence is subject to exclusion for purposes of appeal.
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membership. 347 Secondly, discrimination is largely a matter of intent;
the proof of its existence must frequently be derived in large
measure from circumstantial evidence, often vague and unsupported.
The answers to these difficulties lie in understanding that dis-
crimination is rarely declared openly, and in most cases is a subjective
belief on the part of the party discriminated against. Thus, it can
rarely be shown except by circumstantial evidence. As was said by
the court in Castle Hill Beach Club, Inc. v. Arbury,348 a case involving
discrimination under the New York law:
It may be that the telephone listing, etc., as isolated facts, do not justify
the conclusion that the membership corporation was a mere sham designed
to conceal the truly public nature of the enterprise. But, in our judgment,
the record, considered as a whole, leads to that conclusion. The various
aspects of a plan or scheme, when considered singly, may very well appear
innocent. The true nature of the plan or scheme is revealed only when the
various aspects are viewed as a totality.3 49
And in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 350 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, in commenting on this phase of testimony,
stated:
Implicit in petitioner's argument is a basic objection to reliance upon so-
called 'circumstantial evidence.' But courts and other triers of facts, in a
multitude of cases, must rely upon such evidence, i.e., inference from testi-
mony as to attitudes, acts and deeds; where such matters as purpose, plans,
designs, motives, intent or similar matters, are involved, the use of such
inference is often indispensable. Persons engaged in unlawful conduct
seldom write letters or make public announcements explicitly stating their
attitudes or objectives; such facts must usually be discovered by inference;
the evidence does not come in packages labelled 'use me,' like the cake
bearing the words 'eat me' which Alice found helpful in Wonderland. 351
If the commission finds no discrimination, it is obliged by statute
to serve on complainant an order dismissing his complaint. No
statute authorizes the assessment of damages or penalties against an
unsuccessful complainant. If the commission finds that discrimina-
tion has been practiced, it may issue remedial orders.
No statute gives a commission the power of self enforcement, nor
do any of the commissions have direct power to impose contempt
347. Omao REv. CODE § 4112.05 (Anderson 1959); R.I. GEN. Lws ANN. § 28-5
(1956).
348. 2 N.Y.2d 596, 162 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957).
349. Id. at 608, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
350. 2 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1941). Also note a similar statement by Justice Bergan
in Holland v. Edwards: "Discrimination in selection for employment based on con-
siderations of race, creed or color, is quite apt to be a matter of refined and elusive
subtlety. Innocent components can add up to a sinister totality." 282 App. Div. 353,
359, 22 N.Y.S.2d 721, 726 (1953).
351. F. W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, supra note 50, at 660.
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penalties for violation of these orders. All FEP statutes, however,
provide penal sanctions for willful interference with commission
orders.352 No case has been found in which contempt charges have
been filed, or in which the penalties provided have actually been
imposed.
There are two cases which typify the extent of action presently
taken in these areas. The first is the case of the New York Com-
mission Against Discrimination v. Ackley Maynes Company.353 After
a complaint had been filed with the Commission charging the owners
of a swimming pool with discrimination, a hearing was held and
respondent consented to an order of the Commission requiring them
to permit use of the pool on equal terms and to take other specific
steps toward that end. Subsequently, non-compliance was charged
by the Commission at a special term of the supreme court and an
order of the court containing the same terms as the conciliation order
was issued. Further, non-compliance with two provisions was charged
by the Commission in a contempt proceeding before the same court.
The court found the two respondents in contempt and imposed 400
dollar fines. One respondent was sentenced to a term of five days
in the county jail, although he was given the opportunity to purge
himself of contempt by compliance. Respondent subsequently purged
himself of this contempt.
Second is the case of William v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines,
Inc.,314 which involved a threat to use penal sanctions. In that case,
a Negro filed a complaint with the Minnesota Commission alleging
discrimination in hiring. The Commission, in due course, found dis-
crimination in refusal to hire complainant. The Commission stated
that, if the complainant presented himself for employment within four
months after issuance of the Commission order, and should the
respondent still refuse to hire him, the case would be certified to the
corporation counsel for prosecution without further action of the
Commission.
All FEP statutes except California's authorize the commission to
institute a judicial proceeding against the respondent directly after
entering an order. Wisconsin extends this right to complainant as
well as the commission.35 5 California's statute permits the commission
352. N.Y. ExEcTrmvE LAw § 299. Typical is New York's broad statute: "Any person,
employers, labor organization or employment agency, who or which shall willfully
resist, prevent, impede or interfere with the commission . . . or violate any order of
the commission shall be guilty of a misdemeanor....
353. 4 RACEB EL. L. REP. 358 (1959).
354. 3 RACE RELt. L. REP. 244 (1958).
355. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(3) (1959). This means that any order issued by the




to seek an injunction only in the case of further discriminatory acts
on the part of the respondent.356 Most FEP statutes give the com-
mission power to apply for a temporary injunction pending judicial
review.5 7
A trial de novo may be had in some jurisdictions. The statutes of
Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin provide for such review.
Of these, the statutory provisions in force in Michigan, Oregon and
Wisconsin are mandatory,3- while Minnesota's is discretionary,359
Illinois, although not providing for a judicial trial de novo in its
statute, does provide for a new public hearing by the commission.310
Although the phraseology of the statutes suggests no qualifications
for the application of de novo proceedings, commissions have at-
tempted to limit its literal application. In City of Highland Park v.
Michigan FEPC,3 61 the Commission succeeded in limiting the scope
of the de novo proceeding by restricting the trial court to conclusions
of fact drawn from the hearing tribunal transcript. A full de novo
proceeding with jury, however, is required for trials guaranteed under
the state constitution.
Although Wisconsin has not gone this far under its de novo
proceedings, the court asserts the right to retry all questions and hear
all witnesses. However, it's courts have been disposed to concede
commission findings of facts when a limited examination of witnesses
is made. Thus, in Carter v. McCarthy's Cafe,3 62 the court, while
holding that the commission determination lacked "substantial evi-
dence," acknowledged,
The Court is very appreciative of the fact that the Board of Review bad the
opportunity to see the witnesses, while the Court did so only to a limited
extent. The Court has given full weight to the testimony tending to support
the Board's findings . . .whenever possible in preference to that con-
tradicting it .... 363
Finally, the courts of all FEP jurisdictions may enforce, modify or
set aside any commission order.
356. CAL. LAEoR CODE § 1429.
357. N.Y. ExEcuTIvE LAw § 298 is typical--"Thereupon the court shall have juris-
diction of the proceedings and of the questions determined thereby, and shall have
power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper."
Territory of Alaska, An Act, ch. 18, § 8 (1953). In Alaska, an appeal automatically
results in a stay of the Commission order. In Illinois, stay of the Commission order is
discretionary. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 861 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
358. MIcE. STAT. ANN. § 17-458; (8),(2),(10),(C) (1960); OnE. REy. STAT.
659.026 (1963); Wis. STAT. Awrx. § 111.31 (1957).
359. Mn-n. STAT. AiNNq. § 363.03(6) (1957).
360. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 858(9),(4) (1961).
361. No. 594180, Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County, May 4, 1960.
362. 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 641 (1959).




Fundamental to meaningful achievement by administrative agencies
which possess quasi-judicial powers is the principle that they should
be accorded a status similar to that of a specialized court of original
jurisdiction. This principle has been imperfectly applied in the case
of state commissions against discrimination in several respects. The
statutes of some states, as we have seen, permit a reviewing court
to hear commission cases de novo. This transfer of administrative
fact finding responsibility to a court results in an unnecessary duplica-
tion of litigation. In addition, the prestige and fact finding potential
of the commissions of these states tend to be undermined. Further,
an administrative agency is created to deal with a limited field, and
in that field it is an expert. Its members acquire an understanding
of the problems involved deeper than one can expect of a trial court,
which enters the particular area of law only occasionally. This is
peculiarly the case in the field of discrimination, where judgment and
credibility play an even greater role than in most other areas of law.
The need for fact finding exclusiveness on the administrative level is
thus particularly acute.
California authorizes its commission, contrary to the usual adminis-
trative practice, to apply to a court for injunctive or other relief only
in the event of failure, or probable failure, to comply with a final
order.36 The Commission, under these provisions, must first proceed
to establish a case of discrimination. Then an attempted or subsequent
violation of the commission's final order must be shown before a forum
may be obtained. The issue of discriminatory behavior may in effect
be required to be litigated twice, while a determination of whether
a violation of the commission's order has occurred must be made
during the first and only hearing. It is recommended that com-
mission orders be binding and that their violation be treated by
the courts in conformity with normal administrative practice.
The desire for facility and ease in invoking the subpoena power as
a means of acquiring needed records and witnesses in a judicial
proceeding is apparent. Yet, as we have seen, in several states a
subpoena may be obtained only upon the commission's making ap-
plication to a district court, with attendant delays. Where commis-
sions have statutory power to issue subpoenas, almost all of them,
by internal procedure, require individual members of the commission
to apply for authorization from either the chairman or a quorum of
364. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1429. "Whenever the commission believes, on the basis
of evidence presented to it, that any person is violating or is about to violate any final
order or decision . .. the commission may bring an action in the Superior Court ...
against such person to enjoin him from continuing the violation or engaging therein
or in doing anything in furtherance thereof."
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the assembled commission or board. This has the impractical effect
of causing delay, particularly when commissioners meet or confer
infrequently. The postponement of the obtaining of needed records and
witnesses until such time as the members of the hearing panel have
assembled at public hearing almost invariably results in an inadequate
pre-public hearing record. Much preferred are statutes similar
to that of Michigan which give the commission power to subpoena
records and witnesses regarding any matter pending before it. All
commissions presently possessing such power should provide that
each commissioner or board member has the power to subpoena on his
own motion. It may be noted with respect to the latter recommenda-
tion that, where subpoena power has been given to individual mem-
bers, no legislation has been proffered to withdraw it.
Some statutes permit the court, "in its discretion" or "in the interest
of justice," to remand the case pending before it for additional evi-
dentiary findings.36 5 These provisions, in effect, invite parties to
renew a hearing without specific requirements in that they may
show reasons why the evidence sought to be obtained was not ad-
duced at the original commission hearing. It is undesirable, in the
absence of a finding that additional evidence is both relevant and
material, that the commission be required to take such additional
evidence and thereby possibly impede or defeat the expeditious
enforcement of a commission decision. Such an explanation should
require that the applicant show good faith. This requirement is
particularly important in light of the lack of injunctive and temporary
relief available to an aggrieved party pending a final judicial determi-
nation.
I suggest, therefore, that if either party applies to the court for
leave to obtain additional evidence, the court shall first be satisfied
that the omitting party has acted in good faith; that there were
reasonable grounds for the failure to obtain such evidence at the orgi-
nal administrative hearing; and that such evidence is both relevant
and material to a proper determination by the court.
A major weakness in enforcement is the failure of many FEP
statutes to grant the commissions power to petition a trial court for
the right to impose interim sanctions subsequent to public hearing
and prior to the determination of the trial court. The clear need for
this power lies in the long delay attendant to final relief by court
order. I, therefore, recommend that commissions be given the statu-
365. Mni.N. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(6) (1957). "The court may in its discretion
remand the proceeding to the board for further hearing, or take additional evidence
on any issue . . ." N.H. STAT. ANN. § 59-4-11 (1953). "The court on its own
motion or on motion of any party may remand the case to the commission in the interest
of justice for the purpose of adducing additional specified and material evidence.... ."
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tory power to petition trial courts for the right to obtain appropriate
temporary relief by way of restraining order or fine pending the
enforcement of the trial court's order.366
While conceding that a decision made by the commission on discri-
mination should be subject to review by an independent judicial au-
thority in accordance with accepted administrative theory, as all FEP
statutes provide, reason and experience suggest that appeals after a
commission's public hearing should be directly reviewable by an appel-
late court. The appeals records of the New York Commission on Human
Rights, as well as those of other commissions, show that the majority
of appeals from the trial courts reach the appellate courts before the
issue of law is finally determined. Apart from this consideration,
appeals to trial courts afford respondents the opportunity to engage
in dilatory tactics in an area where, for years to come, issues of law
will be centered on statutory interpretations. A determination at the
appellate level would obviously be more expedient particularly as
FEP legislation is both novel and of compelling public interest.
Further, appeals to trial courts throughout the state, as against appeals
directly to appellate courts, lessen the chances for uniformity of inter-
pretation in an area where the public policy position of the state
should be particularly consistent. We may note that direct appeals,
under the National Labor Relations Board 67 and other administra-
tive agencies in the socio-economic field, not only establish precedent
but also serve to emphasize the desirability of conforming to the
practices of other successful agencies.
Many statutes, as we have seen, limit causes of action to "aggrieved
persons" subjected to discrimination. Formal proceedings based upon
commission-initiated investigation are not statutorily authorized. How-
ever, in order to achieve greater employment equality directly through
enforcement, it has become increasingly clear that commissions will
be forced to take more of an initiatory role than heretofore required.
This is in harmony with the view that discrimination is a public wrong,
not merely a private grievance. Some commissions, therefore, have
sought to act affirmatively by initiating investigation as part of the
366. MAss. GEr. LAws ch. 151B, § 5 (1957). The importance of temporary injunc-
tive relief has been recognized in the housing field in the state of Massachusetts: "After
a determination of probable cause hereunder, such commission may file a petition . . .
seeking appropriate injunctive relief against respondent, including orders or decrees
restraining and enjoining him from selling, renting or otherwise making unavailable to
the complainant any housing accommodations . . . pending the final determination of
proceedings...."
367. The board shall have power to petition any United States Court of Appeals
(including the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia) . . . for
the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining
order... ." National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
1045
1046 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18
educational phase of their activity.
The presence of industry-wide discriminatory hiring, as well as in
certain promotional policies and extensive discrimination among
employment agencies, make commission-initiated formal action
particularly desirable. Such action would have the effect of reducing
general discrimination which would not otherwise be touched on the
basis of privately initiated complaints. Further, it is burdensome and
undesirable to place upon employees the responsibility of filing
complaints in the face of employer intimidation, reprisal and harrass-
ment, which often continues for a considerable time before the
commission is able to institute corrective action.
I, therefore, suggest that all FEP statutes expressly provide that
the commission, upon a finding of discrimination, may on its own
motion institute formal action in the same manner provided for
private persons "aggrieved" under the statute.
